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Do legal institutions of an economy aect the pattern of its real investments, and, in turn,
its economic growth? In this paper, we focus on one specic aspect of this overarching theme.
In particular, we investigate whether the legal framework governing the relationships between
employees and their employers aects the extent of innovation in an economy.
While the ineciencies and rigidities associated with stringent labor laws | laws that prevent
employers from seamlessly negotiating and/or terminating labor contracts with employees | are
much celebrated in the academic literature1 and the media, this discussion is generally centered
around the ex post eects of labor laws.2 In particular, it is not dicult to see that once the
situation to renegotiate or terminate an employment contract has arisen, tying down an employer's
hands from doing so can lead to ex post inecient outcomes. Much less studied, however, is the ex
ante incentive eect of such strong labor laws. Might stringent labor laws, even if as an unintended
consequence, provide rms a commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby spur
their employees to undertake activities that are value-maximizing in the long-run? In this paper,
we focus on one specic dimension of labor laws. We provide empirical evidence that dismissal laws
{ laws that make it dicult for rms to discharge employees { indeed appear to have an ex ante
positive incentive eect by encouraging rms and their employees to engage in more successful, and
more signicant, innovative pursuits.
To provide this evidence, we use data on patents issued by the United States Patent and
Trademark Oce (USPTO) to U.S. and foreign rms as well as citations to these patents as
constructed by Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg (2001). The \industry" level classication we employ
pertains to the patent classes in this data. We measure innovation for an industry in a given year
by the number of patents applied for (and subsequently granted), the number of all subsequent
citations to these patents, and the number of rms ling for patents in that year and industry.
We use the index of labor laws developed by Deakin et al. (2007). They construct this index
by analyzing in detail the evolution of dierences in employment protection legislation in ve coun-
1Botero et al. (2004), for example, claim that heavier regulation of labor leads to adverse consequences for labor
market participation and unemployment.
2For example, strong labor market regulation is often blamed to be one of the reasons for Europe's economic
under-performance compared to the U.S. For a recent study articulating this theme, see the study of France and
Germany by the McKinsey Global Institute (1997).
1tries | U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and India | over the period 1970{2006. They analyze forty
dimensions of labor laws and group them into ve components that correspond to the regulation
of: (i) alternative forms of labor contracting; (ii) working time; (iii) dismissal; (iv) employee rep-
resentation; and (v) industrial action. The index takes into account not just the formal or positive
law but also the self-regulatory mechanisms that play a functionally similar role to laws in certain
countries. While using the Deakin et al. index forces us to limit our cross-country analysis to only
the ve countries mentioned above, these countries account for 72% of the patents led with the
USPTO during our sample period. Given our focus on laws that govern dismissal of employees, we
mainly employ their dismissal law sub-index in our tests.
To obtain sharp empirical predictions that we test using this data, we develop a theoretical
model in an addendum to the paper. The model considers an incomplete contracts setup in which
the rm is unable to reward innovative pursuits suciently since it cannot separate bad luck from
poor eort. Absent such separation, it may be ex post ecient for the rm to dismiss employees
after their pursuits fail, even though this weakens ex ante incentives to innovate. Stringent dismissal
laws alleviate this commitment problem and thereby spur innovation. Hence, we test
Hypothesis 1: Stronger dismissal laws lead to greater innovation.
Since the ex ante incentive eect should matter more in the innovative sectors of the economy,
we also test
Hypothesis 2: Stronger dismissal laws lead to relatively more innovation in the innovation-
intensive industries than in the traditional industries.
Since other aspects of labor laws do not have this ex ante incentive eect, we test
Hypothesis 3: Laws governing dismissal of employees inuence innovation more than other
aspects of labor laws.
Further, endogenous growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt, 2005, for example) informs us
that country-level laws and institutions that encourage innovation should accelerate country-level
economic growth. Hence, we also investigate
Hypothesis 4: Stronger dismissal laws lead to greater country-level economic growth, particularly
in the more innovation-intensive industries.
Finally, our theoretical argument implies that stringent dismissal laws makes innovation value-
enhancing to the rm. Thus, stringent dismissal laws should lead to (i) an increase in R&D
2investment; and (ii) better rm performance. Therefore, we examine
Hypothesis 5: Stronger dismissal laws increase R&D investment and lead to better performance
at the rm-level.
To test Hypothesis 1, we employ panel regressions of our proxies for innovation on the Deakin
et al. (2007) dismissal law index, where we include xed eects for country, industry (i.e., patent
class) and application year. As Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest, these regressions enable
us to estimate a \dierence-in-dierence" eect in a setting with multiple treatment countries and
multiple time periods. In these tests, we nd that more stringent dismissal laws positively inuence
the innovative activity in a country. This eect is statistically and economically signicant: an
increase in the dismissal law index by one standard deviation, ceteris paribus, results in a rise in
the annual number of patents, number of patenting rms, and citations by 6.1%, 7.0% and 9.2%
respectively. In estimating this eect, we also control for (i) a country's creditor rights, its rule of
law, eciency of judicial system, and anti-director rights; (ii) a country's bilateral trade with the
U.S. in each of its industries, which is necessitated by our use of U.S. patents to proxy innovation
in these countries; (iii) a measure of the country's comparative advantage in an industry in a given
year; and (iv) the GDP per capita of the country.
A key concern in the above tests stems from the endogeneity of the dismissal law changes: other
factors that accompany these law changes may be accounting for our results. Specically, changes
in a country's government, such as a change in its political leanings, may confound our results.
We examine robustness to such concerns through two separate tests. First, we augment our xed
eects specication with country-specic and industry-specic trends. This enables us to identify
the eect of dismissal law changes using deviations (at the patent class level) from the average
time trends for each country and each industry. Since some of the above confounding eects would
manifest in country-specic and industry-specic time trends, we isolate better the pure eect of
dismissal law changes on innovation. Second, we examine directly the endogeneity introduced by
a change in government by including a time-varying proxy for the political leanings of a country's
government. We nd that the main eect of the dismissal laws on innovation stays positive and
signicant even after accounting for the government's political leanings.
Next, to test Hypothesis 1 for each country that underwent a signicant dismissal law change, we
study the before-after eect of a change in dismissal laws in the aected country (the \treatment
3group") vis- a-vis the before-after eect in a country where such a change was not eected (the
\control group") around the period of change. We examine the eects of changes in dismissal
laws in the U.S. through the passage of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notication Act
(WARN) in 1989 and similar changes in the U.K. and France in the 1970s. Our results remain
similar to those using the full sample.
Having found support for Hypothesis 1 linking dismissal laws to innovation, we investigate
Hypothesis 2. To conduct these tests, we follow Acharya and Subramanian (2009) in ranking
patent classes by their patenting intensity in the U.S. We interact this proxy for innovation intensity
with the dismissal law index in the xed eects panel regressions. We nd that the coecient on
this interaction term is signicantly positive, which implies that the eect of dismissal laws is
more pronounced in industries that have a greater propensity to innovate. We also shed light on
Hypothesis 3. To this end, we line up the ve dimensions of the labor laws of Deakin et al.'s index
and nd that the \regulation of dismissal" component is the only one which has a consistently
positive and signicant eect on innovation.
In other tests, we conrm that the direction of causality runs from labor laws to innovation
rather than vice versa. As a nal robustness check, we investigate the eect of dismissal law changes
on innovation undertaken by individuals (as opposed to rm employees) and nd no eect on the
same. Since dismissal laws governing employment by rms should have no eect on innovation
undertaken by individuals, these results provide evidence that the postulated eect of dismissal
laws on employee incentives for innovation applies inside rms only.
In our next piece of cross-country evidence, we investigate if the positive eect of dismissal laws
on innovation translates into a positive eect on economic value at the country level (Hypothesis 4).
In regressions using growth rates in value added for each industry in a country, we nd evidence
that the passage of stronger dismissal laws indeed led to enhanced economic growth within the
country; this eect is robust to including the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measures of nancial
development as well as their interactions with external nancial dependence. Interestingly, among
other dimensions of labor laws, we nd that laws that encourage industrial action by workers in
the form of strikes dampen economic growth in the country; the detrimental eect of such labor
laws is almost double the salutary eect of dismissal law passages. Also, we do not nd any growth
eects before the passage of the dismissal laws, which mitigates concerns about the reverse causal
4eects of economic growth on law passage.
In our nal piece of cross-country evidence, we nd that at the rm-level, the passage of dismissal
laws has a contemporaneous positive eect on R&D investment, leads to higher annual sales growth
and (weakly) increases the rm's return on assets, conrming Hypothesis 5.
Our dierence-in-dierence design and the extensive controls for alternative interpretations
should alleviate concerns that time-varying country-level unobserved factors may be inuencing
innovation. Nevertheless, we also complement our cross-country results with rm-level tests focus-
ing on the U.S. alone by analyzing the change in dismissal laws in the form of the passage of the
WARN Act in 1989. In these tests, we exploit the discontinuity introduced by the fact that the
WARN Act was applicable only to rms with 100 or more employees. The left panel of Figure
1 illustrates our identication strategy, where we plot the before-after dierence in patents (due
to the passage of WARN) for rms having employees in the range [95,105] in 1987. Firms with
employees in the range [95,99] form the control sample while those in the range [100,105] form the
treatment group; we classify rms based on the number of employees in 1987 (two years before the
law change) to avoid any endogeneity stemming from the classication itself. A break at the cuto
point of 100 employees in the before-after dierence in innovation is evident in the left panel of
Figure 1. In the right panel of the same gure, we perform a similar visual examination around a
placebo cuto-point of 50 employees for rms with employees in the range [45,55]; as expected, the
absence of an eect on rm innovation around the placebo cuto is easily discernible.3
In formal tests, we rst conrm that WARN did indeed bind by studying its eects on employee
layos. Then, we undertake tests that formalize the visual eect in the left panel of Figure 1. We
nd that compared to rms that were unaected by the passage of WARN, those aected le
more patents post WARN; also, they le patents that are more widely cited. According to our
theoretical motivation, the positive eect of dismissal laws on innovation results from the positive
eect that these laws have on employee eort. We therefore also investigate whether the passage
of WARN has an eect on employee eort in innovative projects; we nd supportive evidence in
that both patents and citations per employee increase signicantly after the passage of WARN for
3Each plot point in Figure 1 is the average before-after dierence for each rm and subsumes a maximum of 16
observations for a given rm into one; thus, what may appear like an outlier in the gure is consistent behavior for
certain rms over several years. Our regression discontinuity results are robust to winsorization of the innovation
measures at the 1% as well as 5% levels.
5the \treatment" group of rms with more than 100 employees. Apart from showing the presence
of the discontinuous eect at the cut-o of 100 employees, we show in placebo tests the absence of
the same at cut-os of 50 and 150. Finally, using a dierence-in-dierence specication, we show
that our results are obtained using the entire sample as well.
Together, the regression-discontinuity and dierence-in-dierence tests provide robust support
of our hypotheses. In particular, the tests based on WARN enable us to shut out any unobserved
heterogeneity that may aect our cross-country examinations. Furthermore, while WARN was
applicable selectively to some rms but not others (based on their size), other federal laws that
may have been contemporaneous did not have such a discriminatory eect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical motivation.
Section 3 describes the cross-country empirical results. Section 4 discusses the results based on the
WARN Act in the U.S. Section 5 reviews additional related literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical motivation
We present a theoretical motivation for our primary tests using a model developed fully in the
theoretical addendum. The model features an all-equity rm choosing between two projects that
dier mainly in their degree of innovation. For instance, in the case of a pharmaceutical company
these two projects can be thought of as inventing and launching a new drug, or manufacturing
and launching a generic substitute for an existing drug. Launching a generic substitute involves
uncertainties due to customer demand and competition. In contrast, inventing and launching a new
drug, while resulting in higher terminal payos in the case of success, entails additional uncertainties
associated with the process of exploration and discovery, and thus involves signicantly more risk.
The rm, which is risk-neutral, hires a risk-averse employee to work on the project. The
employee is particularly averse to the risk of being dismissed from employment. A key friction in
the model is that contracts are incomplete in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), and Hart (1995). Specically, we assume that the rm cannot commit through a
contract that it will not re its employee in those states where project failure occurs due to sheer
bad luck. This inability to commit not to replace the employee stems from (i) the non-veriability
of investment and, in turn, the cause for project failure; and (ii) the fact that the rm nds it
advantageous ex post to replace the original employee after the project fails.
6In such a setting, dismissal laws ameliorate the lack of commitment. Even though the rm
may decide to replace its original employee at an intermediate date before cash-ows from the
project are realized, dismissal laws impose limits on the rm's ability to do so. Among others, the
model generates the prediction that the lower threat of termination created by stronger dismissal
laws acts as a commitment device for the rm to not punish the employee when the project is
unsuccessful. Since innovative projects are riskier, the insurance eect stemming from this lower
threat of termination matters more for the innovative project than for the routine project: The
insurance eect leads the employee to increase his investment relatively more with the innovative
project than with the routine project. Since an increase in the employee's investment increases
the likelihood of project success, a disproportionate increase in the employee's investment in the
innovative project (relative to the routine project) leads to a similar increase in the value of the
project. Therefore, the rm nds innovative projects to be more value-enhancing than routine
projects. Thus, more generally, stringent dismissal laws lead to more innovation, particularly in
the more innovation-intensive industries.
3 Cross-country analysis
First, we describe the data, our proxies for innovation and the changes in dismissal laws. Then,
we describe our empirical results.
3.1 Proxies for Innovation
Our theoretical argument implies that the passage of dismissal laws should lead to greater
employee eort in innovative projects, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful innovation
that is value-enhancing to the rm. Therefore, we employ the number of patents, citations and
patenting rms as proxies for innovation. While patents proxy successful innovation, the simple
count of patents does not distinguish breakthrough innovations from less signicant or incremental
technological discoveries.4 In contrast, citations capture the economic importance and drastic
nature of innovation. Intuitively, the rationale behind using patent citations to identify important
innovations is that if rms are willing to further invest in a project that is building upon a previous
patent, it implies that the cited patent is inuential and economically signicant. In addition, patent
4Pakes and Shankerman (1984) show that the distribution of the importance of patents is extremely skewed, i.e.,
most of the value is concentrated in a small number of patents. Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg (2005) among others
demonstrate that patent citations are a good measure of the value of innovations.
7citations tend to arrive over time, suggesting that the importance of a patent may be revealed later
in its life and may be dicult to evaluate at the time the innovation occurs. We also employ the
number of patenting rms as a third proxy for successful innovation.5
To construct these proxies for innovation, we use data on patents led with the U.S. Patent
Oce (USPTO) and the citations to these patents, compiled in the NBER Patents File (Hall,
Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). The NBER patent dataset provides among other items: annual
information on patent assignee names, the number of patents, the number of citations received by
each patent, the technology class of the patent and the year that the patent application is led. The
dataset covers all patents led with the USPTO by rms from around 85 countries. We exploit the
technological dimension of the data generated by \patent classes" in our cross-country tests. Over
the years, the USPTO has developed a highly elaborate classication system for the technologies
to which the patented inventions belong, consisting of about 400 patent classes. During the patent
examination process, patents are assigned to detailed technologies as dened by the patent class.
The USPTO performs these assignments with care to facilitate future searches of the prior work in
a specic area of technology (Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
We date our patents according to the year in which they were applied for. This avoids anomalies
that may be created due to the lag between the date of application and the date of granting of
the patent (Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). Note that although we use the application year as
the relevant year for our analysis, the patents appear in the database only after they are granted.
Hence, we use the patents actually granted (rather than the patent applications) for our analysis.
Patents have long been used as an indicator of innovative activity in both micro- and macro-
economic studies (Griliches, 1990). Although patents provide an imperfect measure of innovation,
there is no other widely accepted method which can be applied to capture technological advances.
Nevertheless, using patents has its drawbacks. Not all rms patent their innovations, because some
inventions do not meet the patentability criteria and because the inventor might rely on secrecy
or other means to protect its innovation. In addition, patents measure only successful innovations.
To that extent, our results are subject to the same criticisms as previous studies that use patents
to measure innovation (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
5The USPTO denes \assignee" as the entity to which a patent is assigned. A simple count of the number of
assignees in a patent class in a given application year provides a measure of the number of patenting entities.
8A note about the use of U.S. patents to proxy innovation done by international rms is in
order. To compare innovation done by rms across countries, it is crucial to employ patents led
in a single jurisdiction by rms from these countries.6 Given its status as the technological leader,
the U.S. is the natural single jurisdiction of choice.7 However, using patents led with the USPTO
introduces potential biases since it is likely that foreign rms le patents with the USPTO because
they need to sell their products in the U.S. Hence, we control for such systematic biases stemming
from comparative advantages and bilateral trade patterns.
3.2 Dismissal Law Changes
In order to analyze the impact of dismissal laws on innovation, we exploit the time-series
variation generated by changes of these laws within countries. We use a comprehensive list of
dismissal law changes from Deakin et al. (2007), who analyze in detail the evolution of employment
protection legislation across ve countries for each year from 1970 to 2006 and generate a labor
law index.8 The Deakin et al. index oers several advantages. First, the long time-series, which
captures comprehensively all the country level changes in dismissal laws, enables us to conduct tests
that alleviate econometric concerns that may otherwise be a problem in a cross-country setting.
Second, their categorization of labor laws into dierent components { dismissal laws being one
of them { allows us to assess the impact on innovation of dismissal laws vis- a-vis other categories
of labor laws. Deakin et al. analyze forty dimensions of labor and employment law and group
6Since enforcement of intellectual property protection may vary across jurisdictions, comparing domestic patents
led in the various countries would not accurately measure dierences in ex post innovation or the ex ante incentives
for innovation in these countries. In contrast, comparing patents granted in one jurisdiction alleviates such concerns
of heterogeneity and provides standardization across patents in (i) the strength of patent protection; (ii) the duration
of protection; (iii) the penalties for patent infringement and therefore the nature of patent enforcement; and (iv) the
patenting practices followed by the jurisdiction's patent oce for all rms ling in the jurisdiction.
7Lall (2003, p.1664) recommends using U.S. patent data \for two reasons. First, practically all innovators who
seek to exploit their technology internationally take out patents in the USA, given its market size and technological
strength. [...] Second, the data are readily available and can be taken to an extremely detailed level." Furthermore,
the U.S. has the most advanced patenting system in the world (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and most innovating rms
internationally le patents in the U.S. (Cantwell and Hodson, 1991). Finally, U.S. patents are a high quality indicator
of international technological activity (Cantwell and Anderson, 1996).
8The Botero et al. (2004) index presents an alternative to the Deakin et al. (2007) index that we use. Although
Botero et al. (2004)'s index is constructed for 85 countries, the index is available only for the year 1997. Therefore,
it is not suitable to investigate the causal impact of labor laws on innovation, which necessitates controlling for
observable and unobservable time-varying heterogeneity. Another alternative is the EPL measure constructed by
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) for a set of OECD countries for the years 1990-1998. However, this index neither
oers the cross-sectional comprehensiveness of the index constructed by Botero et al. (2004), nor the full extent
of the longitudinal advantages of the index developed by Deakin et al. (2007). Furthermore, the EPL index only
measures the aggregate stringency of a country's labor laws, while in this study we are interested in one particular
dimension of these laws, namely dismissal rules.
9them into ve categories: (i) the regulation of alternative forms of labor contracting (e.g. self-
employment, part-time work, and contract work); (ii) regulation of working time; (iii) regulation of
dismissal; (iv) employee representation; and (v) rules governing industrial action. By averaging the
sub-components for each category per country and year, Deakin et al. (2007) obtain sub-indices
for the ve aspects of labor and employment law (see Appendix A for details about each of the
components of these ve sub-indices).
Third, Deakin et al. (2007) take into account not only formal laws but also self-regulatory
mechanisms, which makes their index particularly comprehensive with respect to the range of rules
analyzed. For example, in certain legal systems, collective bargaining agreements { which do not
constitute formal law { play a functionally similar role to formally enacted laws. Finally, the values
reported in their index are complemented by a detailed country-level description of all the law
changes in each country. Though the Deakin et al. index is available only for ve countries { U.S.,
U.K., France, Germany and India { focusing on these ve countries does not represent a substantial
omission in our analysis as these ve countries account for 72% of patents led with the USPTO.
To examine the eect of laws governing dismissal of employees on innovation, we focus on the
\Regulation of Dismissal" sub-index. This sub-index (hereafter \the Dismissal Law index"or \Reg-
ulation of Dismissal index") is made up of the following components: the legally mandated notice
period; the amount of mandatory redundancy compensation; constraints on dismissal imposed by
the law (such as dismissal being lawful only in case of misconduct or serious fault of the employee);
parties to be notied in case of dismissal (this ranges from a formal communication to a state body
to a simple oral statement to the employee); redundancy selection (e.g. priority rules based on
seniority, marital status etc.); applicability of priority rules in re-employment; and rules govern-
ing unjust dismissal (i.e. the extent of procedural constraints on dismissal imposed by the law;
whether reinstatement is the normal remedy for unfair dismissal; the period of service required for
an employee to qualify for protection against unjust dismissal).
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the dismissal law index for the ve countries in our sample while
Figure 3 shows the variation in each of its components; in each case, higher values represent stricter
laws governing dismissal. Table 1 details each dismissal law change during the time period 1970-
2006; these law changes generate the variation observed in Figures 2 and 3. As an illustration,
consider a few specic law changes. In France, before 1973, the employer was not required to
10notify an employee in case of a dismissal. In 1973, this aspect of dismissal law was strengthened
by requiring the employer to provide the employee with written reasons for the dismissal. This
change is reected as an increase of 0.33 in the \Notication of Dismissal" component and a
corresponding increase of 0.0367 in the \Regulation of Dismissal" index. In 1975, the law was
further strengthened and the employer had to obtain the permission of a state/ local body prior to
any individual dismissal; this law change results in an increase of 0.67 and 0.074 in the \Notication
of Dismissal" component and \Regulation of Dismissal" index respectively. In 1986, this law was
weakened; now the employer only had to notify the state/ local body prior to an individual dismissal
(in contrast to requiring their permission earlier), which resulted in a decrease of 0.33 and 0.0367
in the \Notication of Dismissal" component and \Regulation of Dismissal" index respectively.
Examining Figures 2 and 3 together with Table 1 indicates that the numerous legal changes
provide substantial time-series variation, which we exploit in our cross-country tests.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 lists the summary statistics for the cross-country sample. For each of the
ve countries in our sample, this table lists the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum for the number of patents led, citations received by these patents, the number of rms
ling patents, as well as the dismissal law index. Since the Deakin et al. index is available from
1970 to 2006 while the patent data ends in 2002, we terminate our cross-country sample in 2002.
3.4 Empirical Results
We investigate whether stronger dismissal laws lead to greater innovation. Inferring a causal re-
lationship between country-level dismissal laws and innovation presents the challenge that country-
level dismissal laws are expected to be largely correlated with other country-level unobserved factors.
To infer this causal relationship, we utilize the fact that the dismissal law index exhibits substantial
time-series variation as described above.
113.4.1 Fixed-eects panel regressions
To start with, we employ xed-eects panel regressions of the innovation proxies on the dismissal
law index, where we include xed eects at the country, time and industry (i.e. patent class) levels:
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct +   Xict + "ict (1)
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from
country c applied for in year t (and eventually granted). Since the application year captures better
the timing of the innovation (Hall et al., 2001), we date the patent by its application year. i;c;t
denote patent class, country and application year xed eects respectively. DismissalLawsct
denotes the stringency of dismissal laws based on the index value for country c in year t. Xict
denotes the set of control variables. The country xed eects control for time-invariant unobserved
factors at the country level. The application year xed eects control for global technological shocks;
further, they allow us to control for the problem stemming from the truncation of citations, i.e.,
citations to patents applied for in later years would on average be lower than citations to patents
applied for in earlier years. Similarly, the patent class xed eects control for average dierences
in technological advances across the dierent industries as well as time-invariant dierences in
patenting and citation practices across industries.
As explained by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), in (1); 1 estimates the \dierence-in-dierence"
in a generalized multiple treatment groups, multiple time periods setting. Intuitively, given the
country and time xed eects, 1 estimates the within-country dierences before and after the dis-
missal law change vis- a-vis similar before-after dierences in countries that did not experience such
a change during the same period (see Appendix B for a formal proof). Therefore, these tests are
less subject to the criticism that country or industry level unobserved factors inuencing innovation
are correlated with the level of dismissal laws in a country. Since the primary variable of interest,
DismissalLawsct, varies at the country level, we cluster standard errors by country.
Table 3, Columns 1-3, shows the results of the test of equation (1) using the logarithm of the
number of patents, number of patenting rms, and number of citations to patents as the dependent
variables. For each of the three dependent variables, we nd the coecient on the dismissal law
index to be positive and signicant. This result indicates that strong dismissal laws are positively
12correlated with innovation, as suggested by Hypothesis 1.
In these regressions, we also control for other variables that may aect innovation:
Creditor rights Acharya and Subramanian (2009) provide empirical evidence that when a coun-
try's bankruptcy code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered rms to shun inno-
vation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater
innovation. Therefore, rst, we control for the extent of creditor protection in a country by using
the time-varying Djankov et al. (2007) index of creditor rights, available for 1970-2002.9 We nd
the coecient on creditor rights to be negative and, except in one specication, signicant.
Other country-level laws Since the labor laws in a country may be correlated with its other
laws, we employ the set of (by construction time-invariant) legal variables highlighted by the law
and nance literature (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998): Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and the
Eciency of Judicial System (all from La Porta et al., 1998). The Rule of Law and the Eciency of
the Judicial System are positively correlated with innovation while the Antidirector Rights Index
appears with a negative sign in two out of the three specications.10
A related concern is that the contracting and legal environments in India might be very dierent
from other countries in our sample. Given the relatively limited number of observations from
India, it is unlikely that India may be driving our results. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we
performed all the tests by excluding observations for India; the results stay almost identical.
Bilateral Trade Using U.S. patents to proxy innovation in non-U.S. countries avoids concerns
of heterogeneity stemming from employing patents led under each country's patenting system.
However, this strategy introduces potential biases. Note that since we include country, patent class
and application year xed eects in our regressions, the coecient 1 in equation (1) would be
biased only if time-varying omitted variables at the country/ patent class level that aect these
biases are also correlated with changes in dismissal laws.
Nevertheless, we employ non-U.S. countries' bilateral trade with the U.S. in a given industry
to account for this bias. Countries that export to the U.S. would le more patents with the
9Since there were no creditor rights changes in the ve sample countries from 1970 to 1978 (Armour et al. 2006),
we extend the Djankov et al. (2007) index from 1978 to 1970.
10Since these country-level law indices do not vary over time, we estimate their eect by aggregating the country
xed eects. In omitted tests, we also controlled for Logarithm of days to enforce a contract, Estimated Cost of
Insolvency Proceedings, and legal origin in these regressions. These variables were dropped due to multi-collinearity.
13USPTO, particularly in their export-intensive industries. MacGarvie (2006) nds that citations
to a country's patents are correlated with the level of exports and imports that the country has
with the U.S. Therefore, in our regressions, we add for each country the logarithm of the level of
imports and the level of exports that the country has with the U.S. in each year at each 3-digit ISIC
industry level, using data from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).11 While imports have no consistent
eect, exports are negatively correlated with innovation, although this eect is only signicant in
some specications.
Comparative Advantage and Economic Development A key determinant of innovation is
the comparative advantage that a country possesses in its dierent industries, which could aect
our interpretation of 1: As our proxy for industry level comparative advantage, we employ the
ratio of value added in a 3-digit ISIC industry in a particular year to the total value added by
that country in that year. The data for these measures come from the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO)'s statistics. Relatedly, since richer countries may innovate
more and may also le more patents with the U.S., we also include the logarithm of real GDP
per capita. We nd in Columns 1-3 of Table 3 that neither the ratio of value added nor economic
development have a signicant eect on innovation.
Crucially, in all these specications, we nd that the overall eect of dismissal laws stays positive
and signicant for all three innovation proxies.
Economic magnitudes In addition to being statistically signicant, the economic magnitude
of the impact of dismissal laws on innovative activity is also large. Since we identify the eect
of dismissal laws primarily using within-country variation, the appropriate standard deviation to
use for estimating the economic magnitude is the within-country standard deviation. As seen in
Table 2, the U.S. has the lowest standard deviation among countries that underwent a signicant
dismissal law change. Using Columns 1-3 of Table 3, we nd that an increase in the dismissal law
index by one standard deviation, ceteris paribus, results in a rise in the annual number of patents,
number of patenting rms, and citations by 6.1%, 7.0% and 9.2% respectively.
As for the eect of specic law changes, consider, for example, the eect of the law change
11We match the patent classes to the 3-digit ISIC using a two-step procedure: rst, the updated NBER patent
dataset (patsic02.dta on Brownwyn Hall's homepage) assigns each patent to a 2-digit SIC. We then employed the
concordance from 2-digit SIC to 3-digit ISIC codes. Since every patent is already assigned to a patent class in the
original NBER patent dataset, this completes our match from the patent class to the 3-digit ISIC code.
14relating to procedural constraints on dismissal in the U.K. in 1987. Due to a decision of the House
of Lords (Polkey v. A.E. Dayton Services Ltd.) in 1987, it was less easy for employers to avoid
a nding of unjust dismissal in case of a lack of due process. This law change corresponds to an
increase from 0.33 to 0.67 in the `Procedural Constraints on Dismissal' component of the dismissal
law index. Since this is one of the nine components of the dismissal index, the change corresponds
to an increase of 0.0378 in the dismissal law index. This law change leads to an increase in annual
number of patents, number of patenting rms, and citations by 2.8%, 3.1% and 4.1% respectively.
3.4.2 Endogeneity of dismissal law changes
We now examine concerns relating to the possible endogeneity of the dismissal law changes.
Panel regressions with country-specic and industry-specic trends To examine whether
other country/ industry level changes accompanying the dismissal law change account for our
results, we incorporate country-specic and industry-specic time trends in our test design:
yict = tj i + tc + t + 1  DismissalLawsct +   Xict + "ict (2)
where tj i denotes a time trend for the industry (patent category12) j to which patent class i
belongs; tc denotes a time trend for country c; the other variables are as dened in equation (1).
By accounting for these country-specic and industry-specic time trends, we identify the intended
eect using deviations (at the patent class level) from the average time trend for each country and
that for each industry. Since other country or industry level changes accompanying the dismissal
law changes could lead to country-specic as well as industry-specic time trends, these tests enable
us to isolate better the pure eect of dismissal law changes on innovation. The results of these
tests are shown in Columns 4{6 of Table 3. After accounting for country and industry-specic time
trends, the coecient of the dismissal law index remains positive and signicant. Comparing the
coecients in Columns 4{6 to columns 1{3 suggests that controlling for country- and industry-
specic trends even strengthens the eect of dismissal laws.
Correlation of dismissal law changes with changes in government An important concern
stems from the fact that changes in a country's labor laws are likely to be correlated with changes in
12A patent category encompasses several patent classes. There are six patent categories.
15elected governments in a country. In particular, to cater to their political constituencies, more left-
leaning governments may be inclined to strengthen labor laws. Botero et al. (2004) nd evidence
that labor market regulation is often driven by political considerations: countries with a longer
history of leftist governments have more stringent labor regulation. Deakin et al. (2007) also
document that the primary motivation for labor market (de)regulation is political. They nd that
a rapid decline in the intensity of labor market regulation in the U.K. coincided with the election
of a Conservative government committed to a policy of labor market deregulation. Similarly, a
limited revival of regulation of the labor markets in the U.K. coincided with the return to oce in
1997 of a Labor government which ended U.K.'s opting out of the EU Social Charter. Furthermore,
they nd that in France, the election of the socialist government in 1981 led to a series of labor
law reforms { the `Auroux laws'. These laws, which were enacted in 1982, aected a wide range of
aspects in both individual and collective labor law. Since that time, French labor law has tracked
the changing political fortunes of the main parties.
If leftist governments are more likely to invest in education and other public services, which
may have a positive impact on innovation in a country, it is possible that the eect of dismissal
laws on innovation documented above is, in fact, caused by other factors coinciding with changes
in government rather than changes in dismissal laws. We examine this concern by using a time-
varying proxy for the political leanings of a country's government. We use the variable Government
from Armingeon et al. (2008), which captures the balance of power between left and right-leaning
parties in a given country's parliament.13 This variable takes on values from one to ve, with one
denoting a hegemony of right-wing (and center) parties, and ve denoting a hegemony of social-
democratic and other left parties. The variable Government is available for all countries in our
sample, except for India. As expected, it is strongly positively correlated with the dismissal law
index (the correlation is 0.52), which implies that stricter dismissal laws are indeed enacted in a
country when the government is leftist in its political leanings.
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 show the result of including Government as an additional control variable
to the basic tests described in Equation (1). We nd that the coecient of Government is positive
and statistically signicant in two out of three specications. Thus, within a country, innovation is
13Armingeon et al. (2008) construct a Comparative Political Data Set, which is a collection of annual political and
institutional data for 23 democratic countries for the period of 1960 to 2006. Our variable Government is denoted
\govparty" in Armingeon et al. (2008).
16greater under more left-leaning governments, possibly because leftist governments may emphasize
investments in education and other basic public services, which may in turn be positively correlated
with innovation.
Crucially, however, we observe that the coecient on the dismissal law index remains positive
and signicant (at the 5% level or above) for all three innovation proxies. Comparing the coecient
of dismissal laws in Columns 1{3 of Table 4 to Columns 1{3 of Table 3 (note that columns 4 to 6 of
Table 3 do not provide the appropriate comparison since they include country- and industry-specic
trends) shows that accounting for the endogenous law changes (due to changes in government) does
not materially aect the economic magnitude of the eect of dismissal laws. In fact, the coecients
in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 are uniformly greater than those in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3. In
unreported tests, we examine whether the coecient on dismissal laws changes materially upon
adding Government as an additional control variable by including the interaction of dismissal laws
with the Government variable. We nd that for each of the three innovation proxies, the coecient
of the interaction is statistically indistinguishable from zero (with the p-values being 23%, 35%
and 14% respectively for patents, rms and citations). This implies that once we control for the
political leanings of a country's government, unobserved factors that coincide with the dismissal
law changes appear to be uncorrelated with innovation.
Thus, we conclude that our results are not aected by possible endogeneity stemming from (i)
other country/ industry level confounding factors that coincided with the dismissal law changes or
(ii) specically, the political considerations that may have driven the law changes.
Other robustness checks In Table 4 we also address two additional concerns. Is it the case
that our results are driven by the dismissal law change in the U.S.? Second, are the results driven
by a possible increase in German patenting activity owing to the re-unication of East and West
Germany in 1990? To examine these alternative stories, we restrict our sample to the ten-year
period from 1993 to 2002. The three year time lag after the German re-unication and the four
year time lag after the U.S. WARN Act became eective ensure that the eect of either event is
minimal during this sample period. Columns 4-6 of Table 4 provide evidence that identication in
our tests of Equation (1) does not rely on the 1988 WARN Act alone or on the eect of the German
re-unication.
173.4.3 Traditional dierence-in-dierence tests
Given the ve countries in our analysis, a pertinent question is whether the overall eects
of labor laws hold in the time-series for each of the ve countries. However, in country-specic
regressions, we would not be able to control for general macroeconomic factors and technological
shocks through year xed eects since the year dummies soak up all the variation in the index for a
country. This would represent a severe omission since technological shocks have historically arrived
at common times in dierent countries (Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Given the importance of such
global technological shocks, we cannot draw any meaningful inference from such country-by-country
regressions.
Instead, we use each country which underwent a signicant dismissal law change to undertake
traditional dierence-in-dierence tests, where we examine the before-after eect of a change in
dismissal laws in the aected country (the \treatment group") vis- a-vis the before-after eect in
a country where such a change was not eected (the \control group"). By including another
country as a control group, these dierence-in-dierence tests largely neutralize the eect of global
technology shocks. Examining Figure 2 makes it clear that laws aecting dismissal underwent
changes primarily in three dierent instances: in the U.K. and France in the early 1970s and in
the U.S. in 1989.14 We therefore examine the eect of each of these three changes. Figure 4 (a)
illustrates the dierence-in-dierence for the change in laws governing dismissal in the U.S. in 1989
with Germany as the control group since Germany did not undergo any dismissal law changes
during this period. In this gure, we plot across time the ratio of realized number of patents and
citations in a particular year to that in 1989 { the year of the U.S. dismissal law change. We nd
that while the number of patents and citations are relatively in sync for U.S. and Germany until
1989, post 1989, these measures for the U.S. break ahead of those for Germany. Figure 4 (b) further
depicts this break for the U.S. by plotting a linear t of the number of patents and citations across
time for U.S. and Germany before and after the law change.
The econometric variant of this visual test is identical to that in Equation (1), except that we
restrict the sample to a treatment and a control country:
14India was the only other country which had signicant changes in dismissal laws during our sample period.
However, given the small number of observations for India, we cannot undertake such tests for India.
18yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict (3)
Note that DismissalLawsct is constant for the \control" group. As shown in Appendix B, given
the country and year dummies, the coecient 1 estimates the dierence-in-dierence.
Notice that compared to the usual dierence-in-dierence specication, which contains dummies
for treatment groups and treatment periods only, including dummies for all the application years as
well as the patent classes leads to a much stronger test since we are able to control for time-invariant
country and patent class specic determinants of innovation as well as time-varying eects that are
common to all countries and all patent classes. As in Equation (1), the application year xed eects
enable us to also control for the problem stemming from the truncation of citations. Similarly, the
patent class xed eects allow us to control for average dierences in technological advances as well
as time-invariant dierences in patenting and citation practices across industries.
Table 5 shows the results of these tests. In the rst test, we examine the impact of dismissal law
changes in the U.K. in the early 1970s; the \control group" is the U.S., which did not experience
such a law change in that time interval (see Figure 5 (a)). Columns 1-3 of Panel A of Table 5
report the results from this test. In the second set of tests, we investigate the impact of dismissal
law changes in France in the early 1970s; the \control group" is again the U.S. (see Figure 5 (b)).
Results are reported in Columns 4-6 of Panel A of Table 5. We infer from both these tests that
the coecient 1, which captures the causal eect of the dismissal law changes, is positive and
signicant (at the 1% level) for all specications.
Next, we exploit the dismissal law change in the U.S. in 1989 where the \control group" is
Germany, which did not experience such a major law change in the sample period (see Figure 5
(c)). Columns 1-3 in Panel B of Table 5 show that 1 is positive and signicant, which corroborates
the hypothesis that tougher dismissal laws have a favorable impact on innovation.
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 lends strong support to the hypothesis that tougher
dismissal laws lead ex ante to greater innovation. The economic eects of these law changes are
substantial. In the U.S., for example, the dismissal index increased from 0 to 0.167 in 1989. The
quantitative eect of this strengthening in employment protection was an increase in the number
of patents by 15.3%. The eect is similar in the case of the other two innovation proxies.
19Discussion These two-country dierence-in-dierence tests have several attractive features. First,
apart from providing evidence using specic \natural experiments," these tests also have the ad-
vantage of easier interpretation due to the existence of specic treatment and control groups.
Second, the dierence-in-dierence tests address concerns that the results obtained in Section
3.4.1 are a spurious combination of (i) a general trend of labor laws, in particular laws governing
dismissal, becoming stricter over time; and (ii) a rising trend in USPTO patent applications (and
grants) since the year 1985 (see, for example, Kortum and Lerner, 1999). As seen in Columns 1-6
of Panel A in Table 5, the dierence-in-dierence tests for U.K.-vs-U.S. and France-vs-U.S. employ
samples until 1978 and 1985 respectively. Given these time periods, the sample excludes years
containing the rising trend in USPTO patent applications.
Finally, by examining the eect of changes in one particular law in one particular country, the
dierence-in-dierence tests provide point estimates of the eect of specic changes in labor laws on
innovation using experiments of greatest relevance to policies concerned with promoting innovation.
3.4.4 Causality or reverse causality?
It is important to further examine the direction of causality from dismissal laws to innovation.
As we discussed in Section 3.4.2, political factors were a key determinant for the dismissal law
changes in the countries in our sample. Since these political reasons were largely orthogonal to the
objective of promoting country-level innovation, our evidence above can be interpreted truly as a
causal eect of the dismissal law change on innovation. Nevertheless, by examining the dynamic
aspects of the eect of the law change, we investigate reverse causality in our tests below. For
example, was it the case that the dismissal law changes were eected to provide an extra boost
to innovation already occurring due to some other changes in the economy? In this case, we
might see an \eect" of the change even prior to the change itself. Also, did the dismissal law
changes occur due to lobbying by innovative industries in these countries (in order to gain a further
competitive advantage over their international competitors)? Since lobbying rms would try to
gain a competitive advantage by anticipating the change and responding to them in advance, in
this case as well, we might see an \eect" of the change even prior to the change itself.
To examine such possibilities of reverse causality, we use the dismissal law change in the U.S.
in 1989. As this change occurred at a point in time, it is ideal to address such a concern. We follow
20Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in decomposing the change in dismissal laws into three separate
time periods: (i) Dismissal Law Change (-2,0), which captures any eects from two years before to
the year of the change; (ii) Dismissal Law Change (1,2), which captures the eects in the year after
the change and two years after the change; and (iii) Dismissal Law Change (3), which captures
the eect three years after the change and beyond.
Columns 4-6 of Panel B in Table 5 show the results of these regressions. A positive and
signicant coecient on Dismissal Law Change (-2,0) would be symptomatic of reverse causation.
However, we nd that the coecient is negative and statistically signicant in Columns 4 and 5, and
it is statistically insignicant in Column 6. In contrast, the coecients of Dismissal Law Change
(1,2) and Dismissal Law Change (3) in Columns 4-6 show that while the dismissal law change has
a positive eect on the innovation proxies in the rst two years, the eect of the law change lasts
three years and beyond; in fact, this \long-run" eect is larger than the eect in the rst two years.
The eect in the rst two years of the law change is consistent with evidence in Kondo (1999)
that there is about a one-and-a-half year lag between patent applications and R&D investment.
Furthermore, the long gestation periods involved with innovative projects also contribute to the
eect of the dismissal law change being economically larger for the period after three years.
3.4.5 Inter-industry dierences based on Innovation Intensity
We now examine our Hypothesis 2 that the eect of dismissal laws should be disproportion-
ately stronger in industries that exhibit a greater propensity to innovate than in other industries.
To provide intuition for the design of this test, consider two industries: \surgical and medical
instruments" and \textiles". Firms in surgical and medical instruments have a higher propensity
to innovate and have riskier cash ows than rms in the textile industry. Therefore, surgical and
medical instruments serves as an example of a more-innovative industry while textiles serves as
a benchmark less-innovative industry. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the eect on innovation of the
U.S. dismissal law change in 1989 would be disproportionately higher in surgical and medical in-
struments when compared with that in textiles. Figure 6 illustrates this interaction eect. In this
gure, we plot across time the ratio of realized number of patents and citations for surgical and
medical instruments relative to textiles and apparel for the U.S. vis- a-vis Germany. To examine
the eect of the U.S. law change in 1989, we normalize this ratio to be one in 1989. We nd that
21while the ratios for the U.S. and Germany overlap with each other until 1990, after 1990, the ratio
for the U.S. surges ahead of that for Germany.
In the econometric variant of this visual test, we investigate the eect of the interaction of the
dismissal law index with a proxy for the innovation intensity of an industry:
yict = i + c + t + 1  (DismissalLawsct  InnovationIntensityi;t 1) (4)
+2  DismissalLawsct + 3  InnovationIntensityi;t 1 + Xict + "ict ;
where InnovationIntensityi;t 1 denotes the Innovation Intensity for patent class i in year (t   1):
We follow Acharya and Subramanian (2009) in measuring InnovationIntensityi;t 1 as the median
number of patents applied for by U.S. rms in patent class i in year (t   1). Since the proxy
for Innovation Intensity is time-varying, it captures the inter-temporal changes in the propensity
to innovate caused by technological shocks. Note that the interaction term (DismissalLawsct 
InnovationIntensityi;t 1) varies at the level of patent class i in country c in application year t.
Since our dependent variable, yict, exhibits equivalent variability, the coecient 1 is well-identied
and measures the relative eect of dismissal laws across industries that vary in their innovation
intensity. Note further that despite the country xed eects, the coecient on dismissal laws (2)
is identied too since the dismissal law index exhibits variation across time. Similarly, innovation
intensity exhibits time variation as well, and therefore its coecient (3) can be identied despite
the presence of patent class xed eects.
The principal coecient of interest is that of the interaction between country level dismissal laws
and industry (i.e. patent class) level patenting intensity { 1: Hypothesis 2 predicts that 1 > 0. As
the variable InnovationIntensity is constructed using U.S. patents, we avoid mechanical correlation
between this variable and our dependent variables by using only the number of patenting rms and
the number of citations as innovation proxies.
The results of the basic tests are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 6. As in our previous tests,
we control for other determinants of innovation in Columns 3-4. Across these specications, we nd
that the coecient of the interaction term stays positive, as well as statistically and economically
signicant, indicating that the positive impact of dismissal laws on innovation is more pronounced
in innovation intensive industries.
223.4.6 Eect of Other Dimensions of Labor Laws
Next, we test our Hypothesis 3 that labor laws that aect the ex post likelihood of an employee
being dismissed from employment matter more for innovation than other categories of labor laws.
For this purpose, we run the following regression:
yict = i + c + t + 1  lAct + 2  lBct + 3  lCct + 4  lDct + 5  lEct + Xict + "ict (5)
where 1 - 5 measure the impact on innovation of the ve components of the Deakin et al. (2007)
labor law index: Alternative employment contracts (lAct), Regulation of working time (lBct),
Regulation of dismissal (lCct) { our \dismissal law index", Employee representation (lDct), and
Industrial action (lEct).15
Columns 1-3 of Table 7 present results of these tests; the only dimension of labor laws which has a
consistently positive and signicant impact on innovation is the \regulation of dismissal"component.
3.4.7 Placebo tests using innovation by individuals as \control group"
As a nal robustness check, we undertake placebo tests by employing innovation done by indi-
viduals as a control group, since our theoretical argument implies that labor laws should only have
an eect on the innovation done by employees, not by individuals. For this purpose, we run the
following regression:
yict; individuals = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict (6)
where yict; individuals denotes the innovation done by individuals in patent class i, country c and
application year t (corresponding to assignee codes 4 and 5 which denote U.S. individuals and non-
U.S. individuals respectively). The coecient 1 therefore measures the dierence-in-dierence
eect of changes in dismissal laws for the innovation done by individuals. Columns 4-5 of Table 7
present results of these tests using the number of patents and the number of citations as innovation
proxies. For both these variables, we nd no eect on innovation done by individuals, which
reinforces the fact that dismissal laws only matter for innovation incentives inside rms.
15Note that while the correlation between dierent labor law components is positive and signicant, the tests do
not encounter any multi-collinearity problem.
23In Columns 6-7, we verify the eect of dismissal laws on innovation done by rms using triple-
dierence tests as follows:
yict; rms   yict; individuals = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict (7)
We nd the eect of dismissal laws on innovation by rms vis- a-vis individuals to be positive
and statistically as well as economically signicant.
These placebo and triple-dierence tests enable us to control for any extraneous country-level
omitted factors that may have coincided with the passage of dismissal laws. For example, in Sec-
tion 3.4.2, we had investigated if the endogenous correlation of dismissal law passages with leftist
governments drove our results. These tests provide further evidence conrming that such endo-
geneity does not account for our ndings. Since greater investments in education and other public
services by left-leaning governments should manifest as an increase in innovation by individuals
as well, these tests enable us to control for such endogenous factors. In general, any endogenous
country-level variable that aects the passage of dismissal laws and aects innovation performed
by all agents in the economy should be accounted for in the above tests.
In sum, we can conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that country level changes in
dismissal laws did indeed foster innovation by rms in that country.
3.4.8 Dismissal laws and country-level economic growth
As our next cross-country inquiry, we ask how dismissal laws aect country-level growth rates.
Since innovation is essential to sustain high levels of growth in an economy (see the pioneering
work on endogenous growth theory of Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion
and Howitt, 1992), examining whether the increased innovation stemming from the passage of
dismissal laws eventually leads to higher country-level economic growth can shed crucial light on
the value implications of dismissal laws at the country level.
We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) in employing as our dependent variable the growth rate
in real value added over the period 1970-2002 for each ISIC (manufacturing) industry in a country
(obtained from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database). Since other dimensions of labor laws
24could matter for country-level economic growth, we run the following regression:
yict = i+c+t+1DismissalLawsct+2lAct+3lBct+4lDct+5lEct+Xict+"ict (8)
where i now denotes the 3-digit ISIC industry and yict denotes the continuously compounded
growth rate in value added in industry i in country c in year t. 1 remains the coecient of interest
since it captures the dierence-in-dierence eect of the passage of dismissal laws on country-level
economic growth. The other dimensions of labor laws are: Alternative employment contracts (lAct),
Regulation of working time (lBct), Employee representation (lDct), and Industrial action (lEct).16
In these regressions, the robust standard errors are clustered by country.
Table 8 reports the results of these regressions. In Column 1, we include as control variables
the creditor rights index, log of imports and exports by the country to the U.S. in the given 3-digit
ISIC, the log of GDP per capita as well as the proxy for comparative advantage of a 3-digit ISIC
industry in a country and year (measured as the ratio of value added in a 3-digit ISIC, country,
year to the total value added in that country in that year). Since we had included these variables
as controls in our tests on innovation earlier, their motivation remains the same as before. We nd
that the passage of dismissal laws within a country has a positive and statistically signicant eect
on economic growth in that country. In addition to being statistically signicant, the economic
magnitude of the impact of dismissal laws on economic growth is also large. We nd that, ceteris
paribus, a one-standard deviation increase in the dismissal law index results in an approximately
2.2% increase in the growth in value added in a typical industry.
Among the other dimensions of labor laws, we nd that laws relating to industrial action (e.g.,
the ability to organize strikes) have a strong negative eect on economic growth. By comparing the
coecients, we can infer that the detrimental eect of enacting laws that enable industrial action
by workers is approximately double the benecial eect of dismissal laws on economic growth.
In Column 2, we replace the separate country and industry xed eects with xed eects for each
3-digit ISIC industry in each country (country * industry xed eects) to reassure ourselves that the
results stay unchanged even with this very robust specication that controls for all time-invariant
unobserved factors at the level of each industry in each country. In Column 3, we include our proxy
16Note that while the correlation between dierent labor law components is positive and signicant, the tests do
not encounter any multi-collinearity problem.
25for the political leanings of the country's government to account for any possible endogeneity in law
changes due to political reasons. We nd that while the eect of dismissal laws stays unaected (the
economic eect marginally increases), the negative eect of industrial action laws now disappears.
This seems to suggest that the possible political-economic factors that lead left-leaning governments
to enact laws favoring industrial action could also be the ones that aect country-level economic
growth negatively. From the perspective of this study, however, this test reassures once more that
endogeneity of dismissal law changes (due to changes in government) is unlikely to be accounting
for our results on innovation or economic growth.
In Column 4, we examine whether the eect of dismissal laws on economic growth is dispropor-
tionately greater in more innovation intensive industries. For this purpose, we interact dismissal
laws with the proxies for innovation intensity discussed earlier. Since Acharya and Subramanian
(2009) nd that weaker creditor rights lead to economic growth in particularly the more innovative
industries, we also include the interaction of the creditor rights index with the proxy for innovation
intensity. Furthermore, as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we interact the industry's external -
nancial dependence with a measure of the country's nancial development (accounting standards);
we also include its interaction with innovation intensity. We test whether the coecient of the
interaction between dismissal laws and innovation intensity accounts for growth over and above
these eects. We nd that the coecient of the interaction is positive and statistically signicant,
although its economic magnitude is relatively small, possibly because we are examining this relative
eect within manufacturing industries only (owing to data limitations).
In Columns 5 and 6 we examine the dynamic eect of the passage of dismissal laws on country-
level economic growth. In Column 5, we include DismissalLawsct and DismissalLawsc;t+1 to
decompose the total eect of dismissal laws into any potential eects before the passage of dismissal
laws and the eect after their passage. Since the coecient of DismissalLawsc;t+1 captures the
correlation between growth in time t and dismissal law changes in time t+1, it tests for any growth
eects before the law change itself. As seen in the coecient of DismissalLawsc;t+1; there appears
no evidence of such reverse causality driving the eects on economic growth. Furthermore, the
posited positive eect on economic growth after the passage of dismissal laws is robustly evident.
In Column 6, we examine the short and long run eects of the passage of dismissal laws on
economic growth. For this purpose, we decompose the aggregate eects into: (i) an eect before
26the passage of the dismissal laws as captured by the coecient of DismissalLawsc;t+1; (ii) an
eect from year of passage to one year after passage of the dismissal laws, as captured by the
coecient of DismissalLawsc;t; and (iii) the eect two years and after, as captured by the coecient
of DismissalLawsc;t 2. We nd in Column 6 that when we break the total eect into prior,
contemporaneous and long-run eects, the positive eect of dismissal laws on economic growth is
largely felt in the long-run.
In sum, we conclude that innovation fostered by stringent dismissal laws manifests as enhance-
ments in economic value at the country level in the form of accelerated country- (and industry-)
level economic growth.
3.4.9 Dismissal laws and rm-level outcomes
As our nal cross-country inquiry, we examine whether the eect of dismissal laws on innovation
translates into concomitant eects on rm-level outcomes. The sample for our rm-level analysis
in this section includes the rm-level information provided in Compustat Global. Since coverage
by Compustat Global starts in 1987 and the Deakin et al. (2007) labor law index ends in 2005,
our sample extends from 1987 to 2005. The identication of the eect of dismissal laws on various
rm level outcomes comes from the post-1987 changes in dismissal laws that occurred in the U.S.,
Germany and U.K.17
Table 9 shows the results of the tests of
yict = i + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict (9)
where yict measures a rm-level outcome for rm i that operates in country c in time t. In these
tests, the country-level variables that we had included in our previous tests as well as rm-level
variables such as asset tangibility, rm size, market-to-book value of assets and rm leverage are
used as control variables. In these regressions as well, we estimate standard errors that are clustered
by the country of the rm.
17The dismissal law change in the U.S. after 1987 occurred due to the passage of the WARN Act in 1989. In U.K.,
post 1987, the minimum period of service required to qualify for normal case of unjust dismissal was decreased from
2 years to 1 year in 1999. In Germany, there were three dierent legal changes in dismissal laws post 1987. First,
the legally mandated notice period for all dismissals was increased in 1993 to one month. In 2000, the dismissal law
was changed from no procedural hurdles being imposed on dismissal to one where dismissal has to be in writing. In
1997, the law relating to priority in re-employment was changed to allow precedence to previously red employees in
re-employment.
27R&D investment First, we examine the eect of the passage of dismissal laws on R&D invest-
ment. Our theoretical argument shows that the increase in innovative eort by each individual
employee due to the passage of dismissal laws makes innovation value-enhancing to the rm. Thus,
the passage of dismissal laws should incentivize the rm's management to choose innovative projects
over routine ones, which should manifest as a positive eect on rm-level R&D investment. Col-
umn 1 shows a positive and statistically signicant eect of the passage of dismissal laws on R&D
investment. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation change in the dismissal law
index leads to a 1.3% increase in rm-level R&D investment. In Column 2, we examine whether
the eect of dismissal laws on R&D investment manifests before the law change itself by including
DismissalLawsct and DismissalLawsc;t+1 as in Section 3.4.8 above. We nd that the coecient of
DismissalLawsc;t+1 is statistically indistinguishable from zero, which implies there was plausibly
no eect on R&D investment prior to the passage of dismissal laws, allowing us to rule out reverse
causality. However, the eect after the passage of dismissal laws is positive and robust as seen in
the coecient of DismissalLawsct.
In Column 3, we include DismissalLawsc;t and DismissalLawsc;t 1 to examine any long run ef-
fect on R&D investment. However, we nd only a contemporaneous eect of the passage of dismissal
laws on R&D investment, as seen in the positive and signicant coecient of DismissalLawsc;t and
the lack of the same for DismissalLawsc;t 1: This contemporaneous eect on R&D investment,
which is an input to innovation, contrasts to the long-run eects on the outputs of innovation such
as patents, citations as well as country-level economic growth.
Firm performance Columns 4 and 5 present the results of tests that examine the eect of
dismissal laws on rm performance as measured by yearly sales growth as well as the return on
assets (as measured by EBITDA/ total assets). To avoid problems stemming from questions about
the appropriate asset pricing model, we focus on these accounting measures of rm performance.
As seen in Table 9, dismissal laws have a strong, positive and signicant eect on sales growth.
The impact on protability is positive, but statistically not signicant.
4 Within-country evidence using the WARN Act
In the previous sections, we provided evidence of the impact of labor laws on innovation in a
cross-country setting. In this section, we present tests of our main hypothesis based on U.S. data
28alone. These tests exploit a discontinuity introduced by the passage of the federal U.S. WARN
Act and do not rely on labor law index data. Our tests in this section are aimed at removing
any concerns about: (i) time-varying country-level unobserved factors driving our results thus far;
and (ii) potential measurement error arising from the use of U.S. patents to proxy innovation by
international rms.
4.1 An Overview of the WARN Act
The WARN Act is a federal law that was enacted by the U.S. Congress on August 4, 1988,
and became eective on February 4, 1989.18 The WARN Act requires employers to give written
notice 60 days before the date of a mass layo or plant closing to: (i) aected workers; (ii) chief
elected ocial of the local government where the employment site is located; and (iii) the State
Rapid Response Dislocated Worker Unit. Subject to the law are private employers with 100 or
more full-time employees, or with 100 or more employees who work at least a combined 4,000
hours a week. Only layos classied as \mass layos" or \plant closings," or layos of 500 or more
full-time workers at a single site of employment, are covered.19 In the case of non-compliance,
employees, their representatives, and units of local government can bring individual or class action
suits in federal district courts against employers. Employers who violate the WARN Act are liable
for damages in the form of back pay and benets to aected employees.
The requirement of prior notication to local government together with penalties for non-
compliance imply that the WARN passage increases the hurdles faced by employers when dismissing
employees. This eect is in line with the eect of dismissal laws as discussed in our theoretical
motivation. Therefore, we expect WARN to have the predicted positive eect on innovation.
To show the diversity of companies aected by the WARN Act, we obtained WARN Act no-
tices received by the Employment Development Department in California in 2009. These included
the following companies: Adobe Systems Incorporated; American Airlines, Inc.; AT&T company;
Circuit City Stores, Inc.; Comcast Cable; FOX Interactive Media, Inc.; Genentech, Inc.; Henkel
18The details on the WARN Act reported in this section are drawn from the following two sources, un-
less otherwise noted: United States Department of Labor { Employment & Training Administration (http :
==www:doleta:gov=layoff=warn:cfm); and Levine (2007).
19A \plant closing" is dened as a closure of a facility within a single site of employment involving layos of at
least 50 full-time workers. In the case of a \mass layo," an employer lays o either between 50 and 499 full-time
workers at a single site of employment, or 33% of the number of full-time workers at a single site of employment. For
further details, see Levine (2007).
29Corporation; Hilton Hotels Corporation; HSBC; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; National Semiconductor
Corporation; NEC Electronics America, Inc.; Palm, Inc.; San Francisco Chronicle; SAP America,
Inc.; Seagate Technology LLC; Siemens; Stanford University; Sun Microsystems, Inc.; Syman-
tec; The Boeing Company; The McGraw-Hill Companies; Valeant Pharmaceuticals International;
Virgin Mobile USA; Walt Disney World Co.; Yahoo! Inc.; and many others.20 Clearly, this list
encompasses a broad range of rms including the very innovative ones.
The range of rms issuing WARN Act notices illustrates the fact that dismissal presents a
distinct threat to researchers. As an example of this threat, consider the following passage from a
January 2009 Wall Street Journal article:21
\Pzer Inc. is laying o as many as 800 researchers in a tacit admission that its
laboratories have failed to live up to the tens of billions of dollars it has poured into
them in recent years. [...] While the new cuts will only dent Pzer's overall work force
of 83,400, they strike at the company's lifeblood: the labs charged with discovering
lucrative new drugs."
After discussing our data and test methodology, we will provide evidence of the importance of the
WARN Act by showing the impact of its passage on employment uctuations, before documenting
its impact on innovation.
4.2 Data and Sample
In order to examine the eect of the passage of the WARN Act on innovation, we match the
NBER patents le to Compustat data. Each assignee in the NBER dataset is given a unique and
time-invariant identier. We match the U.S. assignee names in the NBER patent dataset to the
names of divisions and subsidiaries belonging to a corporate family from the Directory of Corporate
Aliations. We then match the name of the corporate parent to Compustat. Additionally, we
augment our match of the U.S. assignee names to the Compustat parent with the recent gvkey-
assignee match developed by NBER.22 As before, to construct proxies for innovation, we employ
patents led with the USPTO and citations to these patents, compiled in the NBER Patents File
20Source: http : ==www:edd:ca:gov=Jobs and Training=warn=eddwarnlwia09:pdf
21\Corporate News: Pzer Plans Layos in Research { Drug Maker Has Little in Pipeline to Show for Its $7.5
Billion R&D Budget," The Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2009.
22See https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads for the details about this new match.
30(Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). The summary statistics for the main variables used in these
rm-level tests are displayed in Panel C of Table 2.
4.3 Regression-discontinuity tests
In these U.S. based tests, we exploit the discontinuity introduced by the fact that the WARN
Act was applicable only to rms with 100 or more employees. Our identication strategy in these
tests is based on comparing U.S. rms that were aected by the law change (rms with 100 or
more employees) to U.S. rms that were not (rms with less than 100 employees). To fully exploit
the discontinuity due to the WARN Act and thereby provide the most robust evidence in support
of our hypotheses, we focus on the rms in the range of [95,105] employees.23 As placebo tests,
we also test for any spurious eects on innovation by using cutos of 50 and 150 employees and a
sample of rms with employees in the range [45, 55] and [145, 155] respectively.
4.3.1 WARN Act and Innovation
As discussed in Section 1, the left panel of Figure 1 shows the break in the before-after dierence
in innovation due to the passage of the WARN Act at the cuto point of 100 employees. To
undertake tests that formalize this visual eect, we use the following specication:
yit = i + t + 1  (Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t + it (10)
where yit is a proxy for innovation by rm i in year t.24 The sample covers twelve years around the
passage of the WARN Act (from 1983-1994).
(Over100)i;1987 is a dummy taking the value of one if a rm has  100 employees in the year
1987, i.e., two years before the passage of the WARN Act, and 0 otherwise. As explained above,
we focus on the rms where 95  (Over100)i;1987  105: We use employment information from
the year 1987 only to avoid any endogeneity stemming from group classication due to the layos
themselves. This is a good instrument for the following reasons. First, it is unlikely that the WARN
Act had an impact on employment two years prior to its passage. Second, whether a rm had more
than 100 employees in 1987 is a good predictor for the other years (including after 1987) as well.
23Since the number of rms in the [99,101] range is very limited, we employ the expanded range [95,105].
24The regression-discontinuity results are robust to winsorization of the innovation measures at the 1% as well as
5% level.
31(After1988)t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e., for
the years 1989-1994). The rm dummies (i) control for any residual time-invariant heterogeneity of
rms and the year dummies (t) control for general macro-economic factors. In all the regressions,
we cluster standard errors at the rm level.
4.3.2 WARN Act and Employee Layos
When examining the eect of the WARN Act on innovation, a key question that arises is whether
the WARN Act indeed binds for innovative rms. To answer this question, we formally test whether
the passage of the WARN Act had a signicant impact on employee layos in the aected rms.
We dene employee layos to have occurred in rm i in year t if the number of employees in that
year are lower than those in the previous year. We then estimate the following linear probability
model for the twelve years surrounding the passage of the WARN Act (1983-1994):
Ind(Empi;t Empi;t 1 < 0) = t+1(Over100)i;1987(After1988)t+2(Over100)i;1987+it (11)
where Ind(Empi;t   Empi;t 1 < 0) is a binary variable taking on a value of one in case of a net
employment reduction in rm i from year t   1 to year t.
Since employee layos due to the WARN Act do not exhibit much within-rm variation, we do
not include rm xed eects. However, to control for average dierences in employee layos across
years, we include the year xed eects (t).
4.3.3 Regression-discontinuity Results
We now discuss the results of our regression-discontinuity tests investigating the impact of
WARN on employment uctuations and innovation.
Column 1 in Panel A of Table 10 reports the results of the tests of (11) for rms having employees
in the range [95,105] in 1987. We nd that the passage of WARN decreased the likelihood of layos
in the aected rms. Compared to the control rms in the range [95,99], the before-after dierence
in the likelihood of employee layos decreased by 33% for the treated rms in the range [100,105].
Columns 2-5 in Panel A of Table 10 show the results for the eect of WARN on innovation;
again we use only rms that have employees in the range [95,105] in 1987. In Columns 2-3 of
Panel A, we report the results of tests examining the eect on overall rm-level innovation by using
32the log of the number of patents and citations respectively as dependent variables. In line with
Hypothesis 1, we nd that the strengthening of dismissal laws via the WARN Act had a positive
and signicant impact on U.S. rm-level innovation. The economic magnitude of the discontinuity
is signicant as well with rms aected by WARN experiencing increases in patents and citations
by 43% and 71% respectively when compared to similar rms that were not aected by WARN.
Given the median rm ling one patent per year, this implies an increase of about one additional
patent in two years after the passage of WARN.
As discussed in Section 2, according to our model, the positive eect of dismissal laws on
innovation results from the positive eect that these laws have on employee eort. Unlike our
cross-country set-up, our sample here is constructed at the rm level. Therefore, we can investigate
whether the passage of WARN had an eect on employee eort in innovative projects. For this pur-
pose, we normalize our proxies for innovation using the number of employees in a rm. In Columns
4-5 of Panel A, we report the results using ln(patents=employees) and ln(citations=employees)
as the dependent variables. Here, we nd that both patents and citations per employee increase
signicantly after the passage of WARN for the \treatment" group of rms. This nding is impor-
tant because it shows that the theoretical backdrop nds empirical support not only in its result
linking dismissal laws and innovation, but also in the specic mechanism we conjecture to be at
play, which is that the positive eect of dismissal laws on innovation results from the positive eect
that these laws have on employee eort.
Panel B and C of Table 10 show the results for the placebo tests using only rms that have
employee numbers in the range [45, 55] and [145, 155] respectively in 1987. In each of these panels,
Column 1 shows the eect on employee layos while Columns 2-3 show the results for the log of
the number of patents and citations respectively; as before, Columns 4-5 report the results using
log of the number of patents and citations per employee respectively. In both these panels, we can
infer that there was no dierential eect at the corresponding cutos that is consistent with our
hypotheses. This provides reassurance that the positive eect of WARN on innovation documented
in Panel A is not spurious.
334.4 WARN Act and Innovation: Dierence-in-dierence Tests
Having convinced ourselves that the discontinuous eect of the WARN Act on employee layos
and innovation is indeed strong for rms in the vicinity of the cut-o, we now investigate the eect
of the WARN Act on innovation for the entire sample of rms. Figure 7 illustrates the dierence-
in-dierence eect, where we compare the U.S. rms that were aected by the law change (rms
with 100 or more employees) to U.S. rms that were not (rms with less than 100 employees); it
shows the linear t of the number of patents and citations across time for the treated and control
rms before and after 1989. The presence of a break for the treated rms and its absence for the
control group of rms in 1989 is quite clear from the gure. To undertake tests that formalize this
visual eect, we implement the equivalent of equation (10) for the entire sample:
yit = i + t + 1  (Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t +   Xit + it (12)
where all the variables are as dened above. Xit represents the set of control variables which
include Size and Market-to-Book ratio and, in some specications, the interaction of Size with the
(After1988)t dummy.25
Table 11 shows the results for the dierence-in-dierence eect of the WARN Act on innovation.
In Columns 1-2 of Panel A, we run the basic specication using logs of the number of patents and
citations respectively as the dependent variables. In Columns 3-4, we also include rm size to
account for the possibility that larger rms might innovate more on average. Second, we include
Market-to-Book to control for investment opportunities, as these may also have an impact on a
rm's innovation policies. In Columns 5-6, we include the interaction of rm size with a dummy
for the period following the WARN passage. This interaction controls for the possibility that after
the passage of WARN, larger rms may have systematically diered from smaller rms in their
innovation outcomes.
In line with Hypothesis 1, we nd that overall, the strengthening of dismissal laws via the
WARN Act had a positive and signicant impact on U.S. rm-level innovation. Compared to the
25Market-to-Book is the market value of assets to total book assets. Market value of assets is total assets plus
market value of equity minus book value of equity. The market value of equity is calculated as common shares
outstanding times scal-year closing price. Book value of equity is dened as common equity plus balance sheet
deferred taxes. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. In order to eliminate the impact of outliers, we winsorize the
variables Market-to-Book and Size at 1% and 99%.
34control group, annual patents increased by 18% (Column 1) for the treatment group of rms, with
an even larger eect for citations.
In Panel B of Table 11, we report the results using the log of the number of patents and citations
per employee respectively as the dependent variables. Again, we nd overall the eect on these
proxies for employee eort at innovation to be strongly positive and statistically signicant.
Finally, in Columns 5-6 (Panel A and B of Table 11), we interact rm size with the (After1988)t
dummy. The positive and signicant coecient on the interaction indicates that after 1988, large
rms innovated more for reasons that may be unrelated to WARN. However, the fact that the
dierence-in-dierence coecient in the specication with citations (Column 6 in both panels)
remains signicant at the 5% level shows that even if larger rms had systematically dierent
innovation outcomes compared to smaller rms in the period post 1988, WARN caused employees
to focus on innovation that was more important, i.e., more highly cited.
4.5 Discussion
Apart from not suering from concerns relating to unobserved factors at the country level, the
above tests based on WARN oer other attractive advantages. Since our sample for the WARN
tests ended in 1994, they enable us to conclude that our results on the positive eect of dismissal
laws on innovation are not driven by any spurious eects that patent reforms motivated by the
General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) may have had. Under the GATT changes, an
unexpired issued patent or a patent application pending on June 8, 1995, has a term of protection
that is the longer of 17 years from the date of issuance of the patent or 20 years from the ling
date of the patent application. For applications led on or after June 8, 1995, the patent life is
now twenty years, measured from the earliest patent application. However, since our sample for
the WARN tests is terminated in 1994, our results are not caused by GATT related changes.
Also, the tests based on the WARN Act mitigate eects of any other contemporaneous factors
that may confound our results. This strength of the WARN based tests stems from a combination of
three factors. First and foremost, since the rms are separated into treatment and control groups
based on the number of employees, any unobserved factor that aects all rms uniformly (i.e.
irrespective of employment gures) cannot be driving our results. Nevertheless, as a second line
of defense, we have included rm-xed eects to account for time-invariant eects of unobserved
35factors, in general, and rm size and investment opportunities (market-to-book), in particular.
Second, we have performed pure regression-discontinuity tests to focus on rms just above and
below the employment cut-o relevant for WARN. Third, in the dierence-in-dierence tests, we
have included rm size and its interaction with the post-WARN period to account for any time-
varying correlation of any unobserved factors with rm size. Therefore, laws or policy changes or
any other unobserved factor that may inuence innovation cannot aect the results unless they
resemble WARN in discriminating based on workforce-size.
Related to the above, the WARN tests also alleviate concerns that our results may be aected
by the coinciding of the post WARN period with the recession in the early 1990s. To the extent
that this recession slowed down the average pace of innovation, the application year xed eects
should capture the same. If, instead, the recession aected innovation by smaller or larger rms
disproportionately more, the interaction of rm size with the dummy for the time period post 1988
should capture some of these eects. Finally, since rms of similar sizes should have felt the eect
of the recession similarly, the regression-discontinuity specication provides conrmation that our
results are not aected by the recession in the 1990s.
Finally, the WARN Act was not intended to specically encourage innovation or economic
growth. Br ugemann (2007) examines various articles in the business press that document the
events preceding and following the WARN Act. He does not nd any evidence arguing that the
Act was aimed at improving a specic aspect of the U.S. economy. Thus, our tests above can be
interpreted as a truly causal, even if an unintended, eect of the WARN Act passage on innovation.
5 Related Literature
In examining the eect of laws on employee stability and thereby the real investments made
by a rm, our work is closest to that of Garmaise (2007). Using legal enforcement of employee
non-compete agreements as a proxy for laws that limit human capital mobility, he nds that
such laws enhance executive stability. However, in contrast to our results, such limits on human
capital mobility reduce rm-level investments in Research and Development in his study. One
way to rationalize our ndings with his is that non-compete agreements induce employee stability
by restricting their freedom from departure when they wish to leave rms; in contrast, dismissal
laws induce employee stability by restricting the ability of rms to re employees. Thus, in the
36setting of Garmaise (2007), lower human capital mobility is associated with less rm-specic or
skill-intensive investments by employees such as in Research and Development since these are more
likely ex post to lead to invocation of non-compete clauses; however, in our setting, lower mobility
encourages innovative pursuits since employees are less likely to be red in case innovative projects
fail (including due to sheer bad luck), thereby making innovation more protable from an ex ante
standpoint for rms too.
Our cross-country tests together with the WARN-based results complement the ndings in
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2009), who show that the staggered adoption of common-law
exceptions to the \employment-at-will" principle (so-called \Wrongful-Discharge Laws") in several
U.S. states resulted in more innovation by U.S. rms. Apart from the dierent setting (cross-
country and U.S. federal law changes vis- a-vis law changes within U.S. states), this study diers
from Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2009) in other key ways. Since the cross-country setting
provides variation stemming from passage of dierent labor laws, we are able to conrm here that
dismissal laws are salient in engendering positive incentives for innovation and spurring economic
growth. Other dimensions of labor laws do not have this salutary eect; in fact, we nd that laws
favoring industrial action may be quite detrimental to economic growth at the country level. Also,
the rich variation induced by the numerous dismissal law changes enables us to control for possible
country-specic (and industry-specic) time trends, which we cannot do in the other study.
More generally, our paper contributes to the earlier literature that examines the eect of laws
governing the employer-employee relationship. Botero et al. (2004) nd that heavier regulation of
labor leads to adverse consequences for labor market participation and unemployment. Atanassov
and Kim (2007) examine the interaction between labor laws and investor protection laws and
nd that rigid employment laws lead to higher likelihood of value-reducing major asset sales,
particularly when investor protection is weak. They nd that assets are sold to forestall layos,
even if these asset sales hurt performance. Besley and Burgess (2004) conclude from their study of
manufacturing performance in Indian states that pro-worker labor laws are associated with lower
levels of investment, productivity, and output. Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) also show
that mandatory dismissal regulations in OECD countries have a depressing eect on productivity
growth in industries where layo restrictions are more likely to be binding.
In contrast to these studies which document the negative eects of labor laws, our study nds
37that stringent labor laws can motivate a rm and its employees to pursue value-enhancing innovative
activities. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) focus on a specic aspect of labor laws | the
extent to which unions are allowed to operate | and survey the existing literature for their eects
on innovation. They note that while U.S. studies nd a negative impact of unions on innovation,
European studies do not uniformly support these ndings. While Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen
(2003) focus on laws governing unions, we examine all dimensions of labor laws and pay particular
attention to laws governing dismissal of employees.
Also related to our study is the work by MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) who develop a
theoretical model and provide empirical evidence that the passage of wrongful discharge laws across
several U.S. states enhances (reduces) employment in industries requiring high (low) relationship
specic-investment. Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2009) nd that the passage of these
wrongful discharge laws across U.S. states also led to increased innovation.
The stance that strong dismissal laws may be ecient is in line with the view taken by many
human resource (HR) management scholars who deem stable employer-employee relationships char-
acterized by low employee turnover, as well as a corporate culture in which failure is tolerated, and
risk taking and learning are actively encouraged, important catalysts for innovation (see Hailey,
2001, and the literature cited therein). \Indeed, the HR literature tends, on the whole, to suggest
that secure, permanent employment contracts allied to a 'high-commitment' management approach
will be necessary or at least advantageous in those cases where a business strategy aspires towards
innovation" (p.3, Storey et al., 2002).
In less directly related work, Simon (1951) and Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975) argue
that stronger labor laws may also have an ex post eciency aspect to them. While the former study
argues that strong labor laws provide insurance to employees against risks associated with loss of
income and employment, the latter claims that strong labor laws reduce transaction costs derived
from the incompleteness of the employment contract. Finally, Lerner and Wulf (2007) examine
U.S. publicly listed rms with centralized R&D units and nd that long-term incentives provided
to corporate R&D heads are associated with greater rm-level innovation.
386 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented empirical evidence that rm-level innovation is causally determined
by laws governing the ease with which rms can dismiss their employees. Using patents and
citations as proxies for innovation and a time-varying index of dismissal laws, we found both in a
cross-country and within-U.S. setting that stringent dismissal laws seem to foster innovation.
The robustness and strength of our results begs the question whether such laws are in fact
necessary to promote innovation. Can rm-level contracts not suce to provide employees the
incentives to innovate? One possibility is that innovation may have externalities and thus institu-
tions supporting innovation might be desirable to obtain socially ecient investments in innovation
(Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Another possibility is that rm-level contracts lack the
force of commitment that laws oer. Since the outcomes of innovation are unpredictable, they are
dicult to contract ex ante (Aghion and Tirole, 1994), which renders private contracts to motivate
innovation susceptible to renegotiation. Such possibility of renegotiating contracts dilutes their
ex ante incentive eects. Since laws are considerably more dicult for private parties to alter
than rm-level contracts, legal protection of employees in the form of stringent dismissal laws can
introduce the time-consistency in rm behavior absent with only private contracts.
Another reason why the law might be necessary to protect employee dismissals and promote
innovation is that rms may be run by short-termist or myopic top management. In such rms,
poor rm-level governance of top management actions might prevent ecient long-term contracts
being written with employees. The law can improve the so-called \internal governance" of rms
(Acharya, Myers and Rajan, 2010) by eectively lengthening the horizon of employees and indirectly
inducing the top management to provide better incentives to employees by investing for the long
run. Assessing whether labor laws are indeed ecient is an important topic for future research.
Our results highlight one important positive eect of dismissal laws, namely their ability to spur
innovation and economic growth, that must be factored into such an assessment.
39Appendix A { Description of the Labor Law Index
This section briey describes the components of the labor law index as detailed in Deakin et al. (2007).
Alternative Employment Contracts. This sub-index measures the cost of using alternatives to the
\standard" employment contract, computed as an average of the eight following variables: 1. Stringency
as to the determination of the legal status of the worker (equal 1 if the law mandates such a status; 0.5
if the law allows the status to be determined by the contract nature; and 0 if the parties have complete
freedom in stipulating the status); 2. Equal treatment of part-time workers relative to full-time ones (equal
1 if part-time workers are legally recognized a right to equal treatment with full-time workers; 0.5 if this
right is more limited; and 0 otherwise); 3. Cost of dismissing part-time workers relative to that for full-time
workers (equal 1 if part-time workers enjoy proportionate rights to full time workers regarding dismissal
protection; and 0 otherwise); 4. Substantive constraints on the conclusion of a xed-term contract (equal 1
if there is such a constraint; and 0 otherwise); 5. The right to equal treatment of xed-term workers relative
to permanent workers (equal 1 if such a right is present, 0.5 if such a right is more limited, and 0 otherwise);
6. Maximum duration of xed-term contracts before the employment is deemed permanent (taking scores
between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating a lower allowed duration); 7. Stringency as to the use of
agency work (equal 1 if the use of agency labor is prohibited, 0.5 if this use is limited and 0 otherwise); and
8. Equal treatment of agency workers relative to permanent ones (equal 1 if the right to this equal treatment
is legally recognized, an intermediate score between 0 and 1 if this right is limited, and 0 otherwise).
Regulation of Working Time. This sub-index measures how employee-focused the law on working
time is. The sub-index is as an average of the following seven variables: 1. Annual leave entitlements, which
measures the standardized normal length of annual paid leave (taking values between 0 and 1, with higher
values indicating longer leave entitlements); 2. Public holiday entitlements (taking values between 0 and 1,
with higher values indicating longer public holiday entitlements); 3. Overtime premia (equal 1 if the premium
if double time, 0.5 if it is time and a half, and 0 if there is no overtime premium); 4. Weekend working (equal
1 if the normal premium for weekend working is double time, or if weekend working is prohibited or strictly
controlled, 0.5 if it is time and a half, and 0 if there is no premium); 5. Limits to overtime working (equal 1 if
there is a limit to the number of weekly working hours, including overtime, 0.5 if such limits can be averaged
out over a period longer than a week, and 0 if there is no such a limit); 6. Duration of the weekly normal
working hours, exclusive of overtime (equal 1 for 35 hours or less, 0 for 50 hours or more, and intermediate
values between 0 and 1 for the rest); and 7. Maximum daily working time (scores are normalized to be on a
0-1 scale, with a limit of 8 hours scoring 1, and a limit of 18 hours or more scoring 0).
Regulation of Dismissal. This sub-index measures the extent to which the regulation of dismissal
favors the employee; note that this sub-index corresponds to the \dismissal law index" used in this paper.
The sub-index is an average score of the following nine variables: 1. Legally mandated notice period (values
are normalized to be between 0 and 1, with 12 weeks = 1 and 0 weeks = 0); 2. Legally mandated redundancy
compensation made to a worker who is made redundant after 3 years of employment (values are normalized
to be between 0 and 1, with 12 weeks = 1 and 0 weeks = 0); 3. Minimum qualifying period of service for
normal case of unjust dismissal (values are normalized to be between 0 and 1, with 0 months = 1 and 3
years or more = 0); 4. Procedural constraints on dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; the higher of
which suggests higher costs of the employer's failure to follow procedural requirements prior to dismissal);
5. Substantive constraints on dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; the higher of which suggests
stricter requirements on the part of the employer to establish reasons for dismissal); 6. Reinstatement as a
normal remedy for unfair dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; which suggest, as the remedy for
unfair dismissal, respectively reinstatement, a choice of reinstatement or compensation, compensation, no
remedy); 7. Notication of dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values of which imply more
complicated procedure for dismissal notication); 8. Redundancy selection (equal 1 if redundancy dismissal
must be based on priority rules, and 0 otherwise); and 9. Priority in re-employment (equal 1 if re-employment
must be based on priority rules, 0 otherwise).
40Employee Representation. This sub-index measures the strength of employee representation. The
sub-index is an average score of the following seven variables: 1. Right to Unionization (taking values of
1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values indicate better protection of the right to form trade unions); 2. Right to
collective bargaining (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values indicate better protection of the
right to collective bargaining); 3. Duty to bargain (equal 1 if the employer has the legal duty to reach an
agreement with worker organizations; and 0 otherwise); 4. Extension of collective agreements (equal 1 if
collective agreements are legally extended to third parties at the national or sectoral level, and 0 otherwise);
5. Closed shops (equal 1 if both pre-entry and post-entry closed shops are permitted, 0.5 if pre-entry closed
shops are prohibited but post-entry ones are permitted; and 0 if neither type of closed shops is permitted); 6.
Codetermination via board membership (equal 1 if unions/ workers have the legal right to nominate directors
in companies of a certain size; and 0 otherwise); and 7. Codetermination and information/ consultation of
workers (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.5, 0.33 and 0; higher values of which suggest higher degree of participation
by workers in the determination process through work councils and enterprise committees).
Industrial Action. This sub-index measures the strength of legal protection for industrial action. The
sub-index is calculated as the average of the following nine variables: 1. Unocial industrial action (equal 1
if strikes are conditionally not unlawful, and 0 otherwise); 2. Political industrial action (equal 1 if political-
oriented strikes are permitted, and 0 otherwise); 3. Secondary industrial action (taking values of 1, 0.5 and
0 if secondary or sympathy strike action is respectively unconstrained, permitted under certain conditions,
and prohibited); 4. Lockouts (equal 1 if permitted and 0 otherwise); 5. Right to industrial action (taking
values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values of which suggest better protection of the right to industrial
action); 6. Waiting period prior to industrial action (equal 1 if strikes can occur without mandatory prior
notication/waiting period, and 0 otherwise); 7. Peace obligation (equal 1 if existence of a collective agree-
ment does not render a strike unlawful, and 0 otherwise); 8. Compulsory conciliation or arbitration (equal
1 if alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before the strike are not mandatory, and 0 otherwise); and
9. Replacement of striking workers (equal 1 if employers are prohibited from dismissing striking workers
engaging in a non-violent or non-political strike, and 0 otherwise).
Appendix B { \Dierence-in-Dierence" Interpretation for the Fixed
Eect Panel Regressions
In this Appendix, we show that the xed eects panel regressions employed in equation (1) estimate a
\dierence-in-dierence" in a generalized multiple treatment groups, multiple time period setting.
We begin with the model specication used in equation (1):
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict (B-1)
During the sample period 1970-2002, suppose the Dismissal Law Index for country c; DismissalLawsct;
changes n times in years t1;:::;tn, where 1 < ::: < n and tl denotes the year in which the lth change occurred
for country c. Denote ml = [tl + 1;tl+1] as the time interval during which the lth change has occurred but
not the (l + 1)th. Let DismissalLawsc(ml) denote the value of the Dismissal Law Index during the period
ml: Thus, DismissalLawsct = DismissalLawsc(ml) for any t 2 ml.
Therefore,
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsc(ml) + "ict;t 2 ml (B-2)
yict0 = i + c + t0 + 1  DismissalLawsc(ml+1) + "ict0;t0 2 ml+1 (B-3)
Subtracting (B   2) from (B   3), we obtain
yict0   yict = (t0   t) + 1  DismissalLawscl + "ict0   "ict (B-4)
where
DismissalLawscl = DismissalLawsc(ml+1)   DismissalLawsc(ml)
41denotes the magnitude of the lth change in the Dismissal Law Index in country c.
Let c0 denote a country that did not change its dismissal laws over the time intervals ml or ml+1 or
equivalently the time period [tl + 1;tl+2]:
yic0t = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsc0(ml) + ict;t 2 ml (B-5)
yic0t0 = i + c + t0 + 1  DismissalLawsc0(ml+1) + ict0;t0 2 ml+1 (B-6)
Because the Dismissal Law Index is unchanged over the time period [tl + 1;tl+2];
DismissalLawsc0(ml) = DismissalLawsc0(ml+1) (B-7)
Subtracting (B   5) from (B   6) and using (B   7), we obtain
yic0t0   yic0t = (t0   t) + ict0   ict (B-8)
Subtracting (B   8) from (B   4), we obtain
[yict0   yict]   [yic0t0   yic0t] = 1  DismissalLawscl + [("ict0   ict0)   ("ict   ict)]
Assuming that
E [f("ict0   ict0)   ("ict   ict)gjDismissalLawscl] = 0 (B-9)
we get after taking expectations
1  DismissalLawscl = E [yict0   yict]
| {z }
Before-after dierence for Treatment
  E [yic0t0   yic0t]
| {z }
Before-after dierence for Control
Thus, 1 estimates the dierence-in-dierence in a multiple treatment groups, multiple time periods setting.
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44Figure 1: Eect of WARN Act on Innovation by US Firms.
The gure shows the discontinuous eect of the passage of WARN on innovation as measured by the log of patents.
We plot the number of rm employees in 1987 (horizontal axis) against the dierence in innovation before and after
the passage of WARN (vertical axis). Each point in the graph is the average before-after dierence for each rm and
subsumes a maximum of 16 observations for a rm into one; multiple plot points for dierent rms may coincide and
appear as one point in the graph. The WARN Act only applies to rms with more than 100 employees. In the left
panel, we show the eect on innovation around the actual legal cuto of 100 employees, while in the right panel, we
show the (absence of the) eect around a placebo cuto of 50 employees.
Figure 2: Regulation of Dismissal.
The gure shows the strength of the \Regulation of Dismissal" for a given country and year. Higher values indicate
more employment protection / stricter laws. The dismissal index data is from Deakin et al. (2007).
45Figure 3: Components of the Dismissal Law Index.
The gure shows the nine sub-components of the \Dismissal Law Index" for a given country and year. Higher values
indicate more employment protection / stricter laws. Each line represents one country (France, Germany, India,
UK, or US). The sub-components of the \Dismissal Index" are: v16 (Legally mandated notice period); v17 (Legally
mandated redundancy compensation); v18 (Minimum qualifying period of service for normal case of unjust dismissal);
v19 (Law imposes procedural constraints on dismissal); v20 (Law imposes substantive constraints on dismissal); v21
(Reinstatement normal remedy for unfair dismissal); v22 (Notication of dismissal); v23 (Redundancy selection);
v24 (Priority in re-employment). These index components are described in more detail in Appendix A. The index
data is from Deakin et al. (2007).
46Figure 4: Aggregate Innovation: U.S. vs Germany.
(a) This gure shows a plot across time of the ratio of the realized number of patents and
citations in a particular year to that in 1989, the year the U.S. WARN Act became eective.
The continuous line shows the ratio for the U.S. while the discontinuous line shows the same
for Germany, which experienced no dismissal law change in the time interval examined.
The vertical line indicates the year the U.S. WARN Act became eective (1989).
(b) This gure shows the linear t of the two innovation measures patents and citations
for the treated (U.S.; continuous line) and control (Germany; discontinuous line) groups
before and after the WARN Act became eective.
47Figure 5: Regulation of Dismissal.
(a) Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and U.K. The
gure shows the index representing the regulation of dis-
missal for the U.S. and U.K. from 1970-1978.
(b) Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and France. The
gure shows the index representing the regulation of dis-
missal for the U.S. and France from 1970-1985.
(c) Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and Germany.
The gure shows the index representing the regulation of
dismissal for the U.S. and Germany from 1970-1995.
48Figure 6: Dierences in Innova-
tion between Innovation-intensive and Non-intensive Industries for U.S. vis- a-vis Germany.
This gure plots the time series of the ratio of the realized number of patents and citations in an innovation-intensive
sector (Surgery and Medical Instruments) relative to a non-intensive sector (Textiles and Apparel) for the U.S. vis-
a-vis Germany. The continuous line shows the trend for the U.S. while the discontinuous line shows the same for
Germany. The vertical line indicates the year 1989, when the U.S. WARN Act became eective. For each country,
the ratio is normalized to 1 in 1989.
49Figure 7: WARN Act and Innovation by U.S. Firms.
This gure shows the linear t of the number of patents and citations for the treated (rms with  100 employees;
continuous line) and control (rms with < 100 employees; discontinuous line) groups before and after the WARN Act
became eective (1989). Specically, the dependent variable is the residual from a regression of the log of patents/










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Table 2: Summary Statistics.
Panel A (Cross-Country Sample) of the table gives summary statistics for the following variables per country:
number of patents, number of patenting rms, number of citations, and the dismissal law index. The data span the
years 1970{2002.
Panel B (Cross-Country, Firm-Level Sample) shows the summary statistics for the rm-level, cross-country sample.
Tangibility is Net Property, Plant and Equipment/Total Assets, Size is Log(Total Assets), Market-to-book is (Total
Assets - Book value of Equity + Market value of Equity)/Total Assets, and Leverage is Long-Term Debt / Total
Assets. The sample spans the years 1987 to 2005.
Panel C (U.S. WARN Sample) of the table gives summary statistics for the main variables used in the single-country
U.S. WARN tests. Market-to-Book ratio is the market value of assets to total book assets. Market value of assets
is total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity. The market value of equity is calculated as
common shares outstanding times scal-year closing price. Book value of equity is dened as common equity plus
balance sheet deferred taxes. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. The sample spans 1983{1994.
Patent data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). The labor law index data is from
Deakin et al. (2007). Firm-level data is from Compustat.
Panel A: Cross-Country Sample
United States
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 13,291 120.518 72 168.881 1 3,172
Number of patenting rms 13,291 49.122 31 59.590 1 728
Number of citations 13,291 820.045 375 1317.006 0 16,726
Dismissal Law Index 13,291 0.070 0 0.082 0 0.167
United Kingdom
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 10,383 8.152 5 12.630 1 297
Number of patenting rms 10,383 5.501 4 6.090 1 90
Number of citations 10,383 44.474 19 72.760 0 1,353
Dismissal Law Index 10,383 0.377 0.407 0.094 0.049 0.444
Germany
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 11,722 18.615 10 24.462 1 365
Number of patenting rms 11,722 9.550 6 9.931 1 113
Number of citations 11,722 83.339 39 121.727 0 1,360
Dismissal Law Index 11,722 0.431 0.425 0.018 0.407 0.488
France
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 10,277 8.085 5 11.700 1 262
Number of patenting rms 10,277 5.157 3 5.366 1 64
Number of citations 10,277 38.271 17 57.678 0 767
Dismissal Law Index 10,277 0.699 0.746 0.150 0.281 0.782
India
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 661 1.852 1 2.222 1 20
Number of patenting rms 661 1.390 1 1.088 1 10
Number of citations 661 4.080 1 8.125 0 88
Dismissal Law Index 661 0.782 0.797 0.040 0.61 .797
Panel B: Cross-Country, Firm-Level Sample
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
EBITDA/Total Assets 191,046 -0.629 0.088 63.829 -23956.5 55.345
Log(St=St 1) 164,863 0.116 0.082 0.600 -9.369 15.008
Log(R&D Expense) 64,217 1.517 1.497 2.310 -6.908 9.408
Tangibility 192,250 0.270 0.194 0.251 0 2.439
Size 195,928 4.851 4.874 2.703 -6.908 14.278
Market-to-Book 144,373 8.974 1.322 649.688 -0.389 222,021
Leverage 159,717 0.537 0.128 66.625 0 26,246.67
Panel C: U.S. WARN Sample
Obns. Mean Median Std. Devn. Min. Max.
Number of patents 13,968 16.473 2 58.933 1 1,612
Number of citations 13,968 172.115 25 700.363 0 21,042
Number of employees (thsd.) 12,822 14.056 2.113 42.476 0 876.8
Market-to-Book 11,648 2.014 1.376 1.870 0.599 12.623
Size 13,142 5.281 5.431 2.557 -1.415 10.274
53Table 3: Fixed Eects Regressions using Dismissal Law Index.
The OLS regressions in Columns (1){(3) implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + Xict + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from country c applied
for in year t. i;c;t denote patent class, country and application year xed eects. 1 measures the impact of
dismissal laws on our innovation proxies. Xict denotes a set of control variables.
The OLS regressions in Columns (4){(6) implement the following model:
yict = tj i + tc + t + 1  DismissalLawsct +   Xict + "ict where tj i denotes a time trend for the industry
(patent category) j to which patent class i belongs; tc denotes a time trend for country c:
The Creditor Rights Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index
and the Eciency of Judicial System are time-invariant legal variables (all from La Porta et al., 1998). Log Imports
is the log of a country's imports from the US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log
of a country's exports to the US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year (export and import data are from
Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). Ratio of Value Added is the ratio of value added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the
total value added by that country in that year (from UNIDO). Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP
per capita. The dismissal index data is from Deakin et al. (2007). Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable is Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Nat. Logarithm of Patents Patenting Firms Citations Patents Patenting Firms Citations
Dismissal Law Index 0.719* 0.820*** 1.070** 1.006** 0.875* 1.459**
(0.396) (0.283) (0.513) (0.504) (0.329) (0.726)
Creditor Rights Index -0.076* -0.057* -0.068 -0.038* -0.021 -0.052**
(0.031) (0.021) (0.035) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Rule of Law 0.128 0.115 0.518 15.462 10.302 14.022
(0.557) (0.363) (0.571) (7.259) (5.744) (7.604)
Antidirector Rights Index -0.352** -0.277** 0.145* -1.924 -0.892 -3.369
(0.094) (0.060) (0.056) (1.078) (0.697) (1.946)
Eciency of Judicial System 0.623*** 0.562*** 1.625*** 1.782 -2.677 10.541
(0.057) (0.039) (0.188) (6.069) (3.959) (7.954)
Log Imports -0.016 -0.026 0.011 -0.008 -0.020 0.020
(0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.013)
Log Exports -0.030* -0.024 -0.057* -0.027 -0.023 -0.056*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025)
Ratio of Value Added 0.020 0.007 0.007 0.026 0.014 0.016
(0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.028)
Log of per capita GDP 0.099 0.119 -0.139 -0.112 -0.103 0.103
(0.957) (0.626) (0.999) (0.924) (0.689) (1.016)
Constant -8.530 -8.106** -14.508** -171.231** -79.494* -249.113**
(4.515) (2.882) (4.008) (44.177) (28.675) (55.677)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE
Patent Category and N N N Y Y Y
Country Trends
Observations 34,381 34,381 31,516 34,279 34,279 31,479
R2 0.836 0.844 0.820 0.840 0.848 0.822
54Table 4: Fixed Eects Regressions using Dismissal Law Index - Robustness.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + Xict + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from country c applied
for in year t. i;c;t denote patent class, country and application year xed eects. 1 measures the impact of
dismissal laws on our innovation proxies. Xict denotes a set of control variables. Government, from the Comparative
Political Data Set by Armingeon et al. (2008), captures the balance of power between left and right-leaning parties
in a given country's parliament (variable denoted \govparty" in Armingeon et al., 2008). The Creditor Rights Index
is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and the Eciency of Judicial
System are time-invariant legal variables (all from La Porta et al., 1998). Log Imports is the log of a country's imports
from the US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log of a country's exports to the US
in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a given year (export and import data are from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). Ratio
of Value Added is the ratio of value added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the total value added by that country in
that year (from UNIDO). Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. The dismissal index data
is from Deakin et al. (2007). Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Data from 1970-2002 Data from 1993-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable is Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Nat. Logarithm of Patents Patenting Firms Citations Patents Patenting Firms Citations
Dismissal Law Index 0.806** 0.875*** 1.088** 1.885** 1.778** 4.991**
(0.319) (0.243) (0.404) (0.798) (0.851) (1.986)
Government 0.017** 0.009 0.033* 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.088***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
Creditor Rights Index -0.045 -0.039 -0.036 0.367** 0.333** 0.706**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.083) (0.087) (0.201)
Rule of Law 2.360*** 1.863*** 2.765*** 3.298*** 2.816*** 4.667***
(0.278) (0.237) (0.314) (0.403) (0.462) (0.756)
Antidirector Rights Index 0.004 -0.001 0.060 0.222** 0.214* 0.397**
(0.044) (0.037) (0.049) (0.067) (0.073) (0.088)
Eciency of Judicial System 0.662*** 0.610*** 0.771*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.057) (0.041) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Imports -0.011 -0.022 0.018 0.031 0.054 -0.007
(0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.067) (0.052) (0.084)
Log Exports -0.028 -0.024 -0.057 -0.071 -0.098 -0.040
(0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.054) (0.042) (0.042)
Ratio of Value Added 0.025 0.014 0.006 0.107*** 0.069* 0.136*
(0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.010) (0.024) (0.050)
Log of per capita GDP -0.934 -0.487 -1.212 -0.226 -0.276 0.330
(0.611) (0.503) (0.697) (1.513) (1.371) (1.094)
Constant -19.540** -18.912*** -23.446** -27.893 -23.251 -53.189**
(3.918) (3.067) (4.710) (13.371) (11.623) (14.571)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE
Observations 34,029 34,029 31,333 12,454 12,454 9,999
R2 0.838 0.845 0.821 0.850 0.861 0.832
55Table 5: Dierence-in-Dierence Tests using the Dismissal Law Index.
The OLS regressions in Panel A implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from country c applied for in year t.
i;c;t denote patent class, country and application year xed eects. DismissalLawsct denotes the index of laws governing
dismissal in country c in year t. 1 measures the dierence-in-dierence eect of the change of the Dismissal Law Index. In this
table, we focus on regressions examining \large" changes in dismissal laws in three countries. Columns 1-3 report the results
examining the impact of dismissal law changes in the U.K. in the early 1970s; the \control group" is the U.S. Columns 4-6
report the results examining the impact of dismissal law changes in France in the early 1970s; the \control group" is again the
U.S., which did not experience such a law change in that time interval.
Panel B, Columns 1-3, reports the results examining the impact of the dismissal law change in the U.S. in 1989; the \control
group" is Germany, which did not experience such a law change in the sample period (from 1970-1995). Columns 4-6 of Panel
B examine the possibility of reverse causality by following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) in decomposing the change in
dismissal laws into three separate time periods: Dismissal Law Change (-2,0) is a dummy that takes the value of one for the
years 1987-1989 for the U.S., zero otherwise; Dismissal Law Change (1,2) is a dummy that takes the value of one for the years
1990-1991 for the U.S., zero otherwise; nally, Dismissal Law Change (3) is a dummy that takes the value of one for the years
1992 and thereafter for the U.S., zero otherwise.
The labor law index data is from Deakin et al. (2007). Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are given in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UK & US; UK dismissal France & US; France dismissal
law changes in early 1970s; law change in early 1970s;
data from 1970-1978 data from 1970-1985
Dependent Variable is Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Nat. Logarithm of Patents Patenting Firms Citations Patents Patenting Firms Citations
Dismissal Law Index 0.149*** 0.222*** 0.187*** 0.376*** 0.422*** 0.339***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 1.397** 1.135** 3.013*** 4.307*** 3.524*** 2.665***
(0.046) (0.053) (0.045) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE
Observations 6,633 6,633 6,568 11,623 11,623 11,474
R2 0.923 0.922 0.886 0.913 0.911 0.876
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Germany & US; US dismissal law change in 1989;
data from 1970-1995
Dependent Variable is Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Nat. Logarithm of Patents Patenting Firms Citations Patents Patenting Firms Citations
Dismissal Law Index 0.854** 0.692** 1.619***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.017)
Dismissal Law Change (-2,0) -0.132** -0.119** -0.014
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Dismissal Law Change (1,2) 0.071** 0.071** 0.218***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Dismissal Law Change (3) 0.173** 0.144** 0.309**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 4.119** 3.362** 6.188*** 4.278*** 3.492*** 5.695***
(0.132) (0.111) (0.091) (0.013) (0.008) (0.029)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE
Observations 20,039 20,039 19,875 20,039 20,039 19,875
R2 0.848 0.864 0.834 0.848 0.864 0.834
56Table 6: Relative Impact of Dismissal
Laws on Aggregate Innovation in Dierent Industries based on their Innovation Intensity.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1  DismissalLawsct  InnovationIntensityi;t 1 + 2  DismissalLawsct + 3 
InnovationIntensityi;t 1 + Xict + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from country c applied
for in year t. i;c;t denote patent class, country and application year xed eects. DismissalLawsct denotes the
index of laws governing dismissal in country c in year t. The Innovation Intensity for patent class i in year (t   1);
InnovationIntensityi;t 1; is measured as the median number of patents applied by US rms in patent class i in year
(t   1). Xict denotes a set of control variables. The Creditor Rights Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer
(2007). Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and the Eciency of Judicial System are time-invariant legal variables
(all from La Porta et al., 1998). Log Imports is the log of a country's imports from the US in a given 3-digit ISIC
industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log of a country's exports to the US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in a
given year (export and import data are from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). Ratio of Value Added is the ratio of value
added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the total value added by that country in that year (from UNIDO). Log of per
capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. The labor law index data is from Deakin et al. (2007). Robust
standard errors (clustered by country) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Number of Number of Number of Number of
Logarithm of Patenting Firms Citations Patenting Firms Citations
Dismissal Law Index * Innovation Intensity 0.336*** 0.195* 0.338*** 0.183**
(0.052) (0.116) (0.038) (0.051)
Dismissal Law Index -0.126 0.138 0.452 0.926
(0.252) (0.218) (0.268) (0.446)
Innovation Intensity -0.124*** -0.040 -0.123** -0.067
(0.021) (0.034) (0.044) (0.057)
Creditor Rights Index -0.057 -0.054
(0.030) (0.042)
Rule of Law 0.311 0.808
(0.427) (0.553)
Antidirector Rights Index 0.078 0.170*
(0.049) (0.063)
Eciency of Judicial System 1.224*** 1.552***
(0.111) (0.182)
Log Imports -0.035 0.009
(0.030) (0.018)
Log Exports -0.027 -0.055*
(0.019) (0.021)
Ratio of Value Added 0.024 0.022
(0.035) (0.013)
Log of per capita GDP 0.002 -0.645
(0.764) (0.989)
Constant -3.088*** -2.545** -14.881** -12.155**
(0.545) (0.613) (4.412) (4.145)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE
Observations 41,609 38,890 32,265 29,874
R2 0.831 0.806 0.842 0.823
57Table 7: Eect
of Dismissal Laws vis- a-vis Other Dimensions of Labor Laws and Triple-Dierence Tests.
The OLS regressions in Columns 1{3 below implement the following model:
yict = i + c + t + 1  lAct + 2  lBct + 3  lCct + 4  lDct + 5  lEct + Xict + "ict
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i from country c applied
for in year t. 1 - 5 measure the impact on measures of innovation of the respective labor law for the ve components
of the labor law index: Alternative employment contracts (lAct), Regulation of working time (lBct), Regulation of
Dismissal / Dismissal Law Index (lCct), Employee representation (lDct), and Industrial action (lEct). The labor
index data is from Deakin et al. (2007).
The regressions in Columns 4 & 5 focus on innovation done by individuals. Tests in Columns 6 & 7 estimate a triple-
dierence: in Column 6, the dependent variable is the dierence between the log of patents led by rms and the log
of patents led by individuals; the dependent variable in Column 7 is dened analogously, but employs citations.
Xict denotes the usual set of control variables. The Creditor Rights Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer
(2007). Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and the Eciency of Judicial System are time-invariant legal variables
(all from La Porta et al., 1998). Log Imports is the log of a country's imports from the US in a given 3-digit ISIC
industry in a given year; Log Exports is the log of a country's exports to the US in a given 3-digit ISIC industry in
a given year (export and import data are from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2006). Ratio of Value Added is the ratio of
value added in the 3-digit ISIC in a year to the total value added by that country in that year (from UNIDO). Log
of per capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are given
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Innovation by Firms Innovation by Individuals Innovation by Firms
{ Innovation by Individuals
Dependent variable is ln of: Patents Firms Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations
Dismissal Law Index 0.803* 0.839** 1.011* 0.002 0.232 0.805* 0.888**
(0.403) (0.280) (0.504) (0.036) (0.232) (0.346) (0.293)
Regulation of working time -0.436 -0.374* 0.359
(0.267) (0.152) (0.448)
Alternative employment contracts -0.070 -0.170* 0.228
(0.115) (0.072) (0.159)
Employee representation 0.706* 0.610** -0.448
(0.313) (0.190) (0.503)
Industrial action -0.393 -0.361 0.833*
(0.298) (0.187) (0.387)
Creditor Rights Index -0.062 -0.046* -0.022 0.005 0.038 -0.115 -0.158**
(0.031) (0.021) (0.032) (0.005) (0.033) (0.063) (0.053)
Rule of Law 0.041 0.061 0.424 0.009 -0.004 0.147 0.363
(0.588) (0.385) (0.643) (0.046) (0.201) (0.602) (0.633)
Antidirector Rights Index -0.304** -0.237** 0.143** -0.031** -0.057 -0.334** -0.283*
(0.080) (0.053) (0.036) (0.009) (0.040) (0.112) (0.115)
Eciency of Judicial System 0.412** 0.340*** 1.962*** 0.015 0.013 0.701*** 0.832***
(0.114) (0.069) (0.194) (0.009) (0.053) (0.096) (0.106)
Log Imports -0.015 -0.026 0.013 0.025 0.058 0.009 -0.102
(0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.028) (0.051) (0.047) (0.129)
Log Exports -0.030* -0.024 -0.057* 0.004 0.053 -0.079 -0.277
(0.013) (0.015) (0.024) (0.029) (0.071) (0.063) (0.131)
Ratio of Value Added 0.020 0.007 0.008 -0.012 -0.018 0.032 0.027
(0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.006) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030)
Log of per capita GDP 0.341 0.296 -0.019 -0.013 0.020 0.032 -0.276
(1.052) (0.690) (1.187) (0.076) (0.346) (1.010) (1.060)
Constant -8.441 -7.417* -18.180*** 0.017 -0.328 -6.341 -9.455
(4.145) (2.757) (3.412) (0.387) (1.951) (5.038) (5.099)
Patent Class, Country, Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Application year FE
Observations 34,381 34,381 31,516 32,941 32,941 32,941 30,159
R2 0.837 0.844 0.820 0.146 0.110 0.830 0.795
58Table 8: Eect of Labor Laws on Economic Growth.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i+c+t+1DismissalLawsct+2lAct+3lBct+4lDct+5lEct+Xict+"ict where i now denotes
the 3-digit ISIC industry and yict denotes the continuously compounded growth rate in value added in industry i in
country c in year t; 1 captures the dierence-in-dierence eect of the passage of dismissal laws on economic growth.
Xict denotes the set of control variables. The specication in Column 5 uses the variable Accounting Standards as
a measure of the country's nancial development and the variable Financial Dependence, a measure of an industry's
external nancial dependence; both variables are from Rajan and Zingales (1998). The value added data is obtained
from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database. The description of the other explanatory variables can be found in
the previous tables, and will be omitted here to conserve space.
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is continuously compounded growth in real value added at the 3-digit ISIC level
Dismissal Law Indext 0.260* 0.266* 0.313* 0.277** 0.395* -0.251
(0.106) (0.105) (0.100) (0.078) (0.168) (0.360)
Dismissal Law Indext* Innovation intensity 0.015*
(0.005)
Dismissal Law Indext+1 -0.152 -0.078
(0.150) (0.329)
Dismissal Law Indext 2 0.733**
(0.156)
Alternative employment contracts -0.054 -0.056 -0.085 -0.080 -0.059 0.003
(0.107) (0.110) (0.125) (0.118) (0.047) (0.090)
Regulation of working time -0.037 -0.040 -0.160** -0.140** -0.190* 0.034
(0.163) (0.166) (0.047) (0.025) (0.074) (0.158)
Employee representation 0.358 0.365 0.454 0.438 0.269*** 0.278
(0.202) (0.203) (0.224) (0.217) (0.024) (0.184)
Industrial action -0.536** -0.535* -0.165 -0.183 -0.055 -0.628**
(0.191) (0.200) (0.196) (0.176) (0.249) (0.218)
Creditor Rights Index -0.053 -0.053 0.051 0.050 0.007 -0.077
(0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.075) (0.038) (0.079)
Log of per capita GDP 0.103 0.086 0.115 0.096 0.488 0.091
(0.223) (0.219) (0.344) (0.286) (0.339) (0.263)
Log of imports 0.007*** 0.014** 0.013 0.007 0.007
(0.001) (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004)
Log of exports -0.005** -0.010* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Ratio of value added 0.587*** 1.019** 0.676** 0.547*** 0.552***
(0.084) (0.291) (0.151) (0.065) (0.080)
Government -0.003 -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Creditor rights index * Innovation intensity -0.001
(0.001)
Accounting Standards * Financial dependence -0.001
(0.001)




Constant -0.937 -0.592 -1.285 -1.236 -5.122 -0.905
(2.425) (2.299) (3.585) (3.052) (3.667) (2.772)
Country FE Y N N Y Y Y
Country x ISIC FE N Y Y N N N
ISIC FE Y N N Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,252 3,252 2,577 2,577 2,481 3,250
R2 0.304 0.316 0.476 0.467 0.473 0.310
59Table 9: Fixed Eects Regressions using Dismissal Law Index: Firm-Level Outcomes.
The OLS regressions below implement the following model:
yict = i + t + 1  DismissalLawsct + Xict + "ict
where yict is the dependent variable for rm i in country c and year t. i;t denote rm and year xed eects.
1 measures the impact of dismissal laws on the dependent variables (Log of R&D Expense in Columns 1{3; Sales
Growth in Column 4; EBITDA / Total Assets in Column 5). Xict denotes a set of control variables.
The Creditor Rights Index is from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and
the Eciency of Judicial System are time-invariant legal variables (all from La Porta et al., 1998). Log of per capita
GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita. The Dismissal Law Index is from Deakin et al. (2007). The rm-level
control variables, obtained from Compustat Global, are: Tangibility (Net Property, Plant and Equipment/Total As-
sets), Size (Log(Total Assets)), Market-to-book (Total Assets - Book value of Equity + Market value of Equity)/Total
Assets), and Leverage (Long-Term Debt / Total Assets). The dependent variables are also obtained from Compustat
Global. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is: Log(R&D Expense) Log(St=St 1) EBITDA/Assets
Dismissal Law Indext 0.158** 0.198* 0.143* 0.842*** 22.217
(0.053) (0.104) (0.058) (0.153) (18.279)
Dismissal Law Indext 1 0.415
(0.518)
Dismissal Law Indext+1 -0.782
(1.378)
Creditor Rights Index -0.367* -0.294 -0.379* 0.043 2.048
(0.143) (0.141) (0.144) (0.030) (1.975)
Rule of Law -0.447 -0.361 -0.423 0.185 6.451
(0.317) (0.351) (0.309) (0.095) (5.189)
Antidirector Rights Index -0.010 -0.028 -0.000 0.098*** 1.612
(0.017) (0.032) (0.009) (0.013) (0.878)
Eciency of Judicial System 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of per capita GDP 0.826 0.822 0.830 0.048 -0.799
(0.469) (0.480) (0.466) (0.114) (6.399)
Tangibility 1.322*** 1.321*** 1.322*** -0.071*** 7.811***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.466)
Size 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.157*** 4.922***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.339)
Market-to-book 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.209***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant -5.385** -6.117*** -5.681** -3.278*** -93.064**
(1.503) (1.291) (1.489) (0.247) (29.288)
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 45,707 45,369 45,707 103,910 115,475
R2 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.149 0.426
60Table 10: Regression Discontinuity
Test Design: Impact of WARN Act on U.S. Firm-Level Innovation and Employment.
The regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1  (Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t + Xit + it
i and t are rm and year xed eects, respectively. Across all three panels, the dependent variables (yit) are: In Column 1,
Ind(Empi;t  Empi;t 1 < 0) is a binary variable taking on a value of one in case of a net employment reduction in rm i from
year t   1 to year t. In Columns 3 & 4, the dependent variables are (the log of) patents and citations, and in Columns 4 & 5,
(the log of) patents and citations scaled by the number of employees. (Over100)i;1987 is a dummy variable taking the value of
one in each year if a given rm has  100 employees in 1987, and zero otherwise; as, for a given rm, this variable does not
vary over time, its eect is subsumed in the rm dummies. (After1988)t is a dummy taking the value of one after the passage
of the WARN Act (i.e. the years 1989-1994); this coecient is subsumed by the year dummies. Market-to-Book ratio is the
market value of assets to total book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Patent data is from the NBER Patents File
(Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level data is from Compustat.
In Panel A, the sample is restricted to rms whose 1987 employment is just below or just above the relevant WARN cuto, i.e.
rms with employment between 95 and 105 employees. In Panel B, the sample is restricted to rms whose 1987 employment
is between 45 and 55 employees. Finally, in Panel C, only rms whose employment in the year 1987 is between 145 and 155
are included in the sample.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A: 95  Employmenti;1987  105
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Ind(Empi;t   Empi;t 1 < 0) Log Log Log(Patents/ Log(Citations/
Linear probability model (Patents) (Citations) Employees) Employees)
(Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t -0.336** 0.357* 0.536* 1.051** 1.088**
(0.159) (0.212) (0.289) (0.513) (0.510)
(Over100)i;1987 0.314***
(0.118)
Constant 0.187 1.313*** 3.399*** -3.323*** -1.205***
(0.127) (0.092) (0.179) (0.394) (0.391)
Firm FE N Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 279 618 618 511 511
R2 0.087 0.761 0.704 0.671 0.725
PANEL B: 45  Employmenti;1987  55
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Ind(Empi;t   Empi;t 1 < 0) Log Log Log(Patents/ Log(Citations/
Linear probability model (Patents) (Citations) Employees) Employees)
(Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t -0.222 0.054 1.165** -0.437 0.721
(0.364) (0.217) (0.471) (0.352) (0.484)
(Over100)i;1987 0.193
(0.232)
Constant 0.205 0.862*** 2.695*** -3.454*** -1.657***
(0.299) (0.198) (0.343) (0.296) (0.196)
Firm FE N Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 63 143 143 129 129
R2 0.204 0.532 0.663 0.799 0.726
PANEL C: 145  Employmenti;1987  155
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is Ind(Empi;t   Empi;t 1 < 0) Log Log Log(Patents/ Log(Citations/
Linear probability model (Patents) (Citations) Employees) Employees)
(Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t 0.658** -0.397 0.100 -0.581 -0.383
(0.278) (0.427) (0.684) (0.762) (1.074)
(Over100)i;1987 -0.273
(0.191)
Constant -0.000 1.273*** 3.258*** -2.542*** -0.626
(0.000) (0.106) (0.376) (0.259) (0.601)
Firm FE N Y Y Y Y
Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 43 79 79 73 73
R2 0.383 0.712 0.811 0.630 0.807
61Table 11:
Dierence-in-dierence Tests: Impact of WARN Act on U.S. Firm-Level Innovation.
The regressions below implement the following model:
yit = i + t + 1  (Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t + Xit + it
i and t are rm and year xed eects, respectively. (Over100)i;1987 is a dummy variable taking the value of one
in each year if a given rm has  100 employees in 1987, and zero otherwise; as, for a given rm, this variable does
not vary over time, its eect is subsumed in the rm dummies. (After1988)t is a dummy taking the value of one
after the passage of the WARN Act (i.e. the years 1989-1994); this coecient is subsumed by the year dummies.
Market-to-Book ratio is the market value of assets to total book assets. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Patent
data is from the NBER Patents File (Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg, 2001). Firm-level data is from Compustat.
In Panel A, the dependent variables are the natural logarithm of patents, as well as the natural logarithm of citations.
In Panel B, the patents and citations are scaled by the number of employees (in thousand) before taking the log.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the rm level) are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is ln of: Patents Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations
(Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t 0.165*** 0.435*** 0.214*** 0.446*** 0.060 0.272**
(0.047) (0.084) (0.053) (0.103) (0.067) (0.125)
Size 0.176*** 0.148*** 0.168*** 0.139***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.037)
Size * (After1988)t 0.032*** 0.036**
(0.010) (0.016)
Market-to-Book -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Constant 1.557*** 3.415*** 0.728*** 2.729*** 0.777*** 2.785***
(0.021) (0.038) (0.130) (0.200) (0.129) (0.198)
Firm & Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,038 13,038 10,321 10,321 10,321 10,321
R2 0.879 0.787 0.896 0.810 0.897 0.810
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable is ln of Patents/ Citations/ Patents/ Citations/ Patents/ Citations/
Employees Employees Employees Employees Employees Employees
(Over100)i;1987  (After1988)t 0.644*** 0.929*** 0.327*** 0.554*** 0.164 0.372**
(0.133) (0.132) (0.092) (0.114) (0.123) (0.146)
Size -0.397*** -0.429*** -0.405*** -0.438***
(0.028) (0.040) (0.029) (0.040)
Size * (After1988)t 0.034*** 0.039**
(0.012) (0.016)
Market-to-Book -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant -5.950*** -4.098*** -3.998*** -1.978*** -3.945*** -1.919***
(0.032) (0.045) (0.151) (0.213) (0.152) (0.213)
Firm & Application Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 11,687 11,687 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255
R2 0.924 0.858 0.939 0.864 0.939 0.864
62